Saturday, 18 October 2008

On Russia, Part III: US-Russian relations

US-Russian relations are at their lowest point in decades, arguably since the 1960's. While the threat of direct military/nuclear confrontation is remote, the two countries have stopped talking to one another. This is troubling when US-Russian cooperation is critical to solving many of the world's most pressing challenges. Some background:

Vladimir Putin spent his presidency's first term consolidating political power, stabilizing the Russian economy, and seizing control of the country's energy sector. The US took little note. 9/11 and the "war on terror" occupied America domestically and abroad, and Russia was by all accounts a helpful ally. Putin was the first foreign leader to speak with George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks, Russia quietly helped the US prepare for Afghanistan, and it seemed as if the two countries would be natural allies in the post-9/11 world (Russia, after all, has its own terrorism problem).
But a funny little quagmire happened on the way to the party: Iraq. Russia was decidedly against US military expansion in the middle east, and aligned itself with European powers France and Germany against US hegemony. Iraq was the opening Putin needed to shift Russia's foreign policy in contrast to the US, which in retrospect appears to have been his intention all along. In 2005, Putin told the Federal Assembly that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century". Russian rhetoric had turned sharply against the US, and Putin began to present the world an alternative vision to US hegemony.
Iraq, Syria, Iran. On each of these issues, Russia used its voice, influence, and Security Council veto in opposition to US interests. Russia re-asserted its influence over Eastern Europe and the Caucasus through energy leverage and the undermining of democratic movements. This fundamentally clashed with US (and European) policy in the region. Putin's 2007 "Munich speech", in which he lashed out at the US and its "unipolar" project, was years in the making, sharpened by US missile defense plans and prospective NATO expansion, and fed by a punch-drunk confidence derived from petro-dollars and energy leverage in Europe. It marked a new, more hostile, era in US-Russian relations.
Russia's incursion into Georgia was a watershed, with both sides lashing out at the other over those circumstances and, opportunistically, more. The war also convinced the White House that Russia was now a direct threat to US interests. This has resulted in a suspension of almost all communication between the two sides, and a decidedly icy outlook on future relations.
Three angles are important to understanding why this relationship deteriorated, and how it will develop over the coming years:
-one must look at the domestic landscape to understand Russia's foreign policy. Putin's project (political consolidation, economic nationalization, etc.) has relied on/fostered a strong nationalist sentiment within Russia. The creation of external threats is often necessary to build public support in favor of authoritarian consolidation. This works particularly well in Russia, feeding anti-immigrant sentiment, conjuring the emotion over Chechnya, and speaking to a general sense of having been "humiliated" following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nashi, Kremlin sponsored youth summer camps, and anti-immigrant violence are all expressions of this nationalism. The Kremlin and its surrogates have fostered an image of the US as a country bent on humiliating (post-Soviet collapse), surrounding (NATO), and infiltrating Russian society (opposition groups, critical press, etc.). The perception of an imperial US is shared by Putin, the silvoki, and extreme (well connected) elements of the Russian population. The nationalism the Kremlin has fostered is dangerous, it will prove difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.
-The US appears to have been seriously blind to Russia's methodical build-up since 2001. The war in Georgia seemed to catch US officials completely off-guard. It took weeks for a clear, consistent message to come out of the US government. For an administration populated by so many creatures of the Cold War (not least, Secretary of State Rice, a renowned scholar on the USSR/Russia before joining the Bush administration), it is stunning the US was not better positioned for such events. Sure, missile defense plans have been developed with an eye towards Russia, and US policy in Central Asia is as much about securing Western energy supplies as it is the "war on terror". But the lack of insight into Russian motives and sensitivities demonstrated by the Bush administration is surprising. A final point: for all of the cowboy diplomacy and reckless unilateralism of the first Bush administration, the second term has been defined by genuine multilaterism and pragmatic, realist diplomacy. Whatever the impetus, the Bush administration does not get enough credit for this shift. It is this context that makes the suspension of almost all communication with on America's most important partners so stunning.
-the way forward is unclear. Without dialogue, the two countries risk a dangerous game of chicken, where each side positions itself against the other on critical issues. I strongly disagree with all the talk over a new cold war. It is in neither country's ultimate interest, and circumstances will bind them to a minimum level of cooperation (Russia's financial and economic problems in the current environment, the US need for Russian assistance on Iran). But on significant issues (energy, Afghanistan/Pakistan, financial crisis), they do fundamentally disagree, and a lack of dialogue will undoubtedly lead to confrontation. The importance of regimes in this context cannot be understated.
A working relationship between the US and Russia is critical to solving the energy, financial, political, arms control, and terrorism-related challenges of our time. They should start talking now.

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