Tuesday, 31 August 2010

Where is the recovery going to come from?

PIMCO's Mohamed El-Erian asks the same question, but does a much better job than I in providing a comprehensive look at the global economy. I really like this piece because it takes a step back from the to-and-fro of daily market reporting and punditry - what you have instead is a healthy dose of perspective:

"In sum, the current policy approaches here and abroad are unlikely to deliver a durable and robust U.S. recovery and, critically, create sufficient growth in jobs. Yet the main debate in Washington is whether to do more of the same -- namely, another fiscal stimulus and another round of quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve. This clearly conflicts with evidence that a broader and more holistic response is needed....

What is critical to keep in mind is that this situation is part of a broad, multiyear process driven by national and global realignments. It's a secular phenomenon that needs to be better understood and navigated -- by recognizing its structural dimensions and by urgently broadening the excessively cyclical policy mindsets that abound. Unfortunately, the approach in too many industrial countries has been to kick the can down the road, seemingly hoping for a series of immaculate economic recoveries.

Policymakers must break this active inertia by implementing a structural vision to accompany their current cyclical focus. Measures are needed to address key issues, which include the change in drivers of growth and employment creation; the high risk of skill erosion and lost labor productivity; financial deleveraging in the private sector; debt overhangs; the uncertain regulatory environment; and the unacceptably high risks facing the most vulnerable segments of society.
Is there anything else?
"An already polarized political environment is becoming even more fractured by real and far less substantive issues. There is virtually no political center that can anchor consensus and enable sustained implementation of policy. Meanwhile, as anti-Washington sentiments rise, interest in a national agenda is increasingly giving way to the election cycle. Internationally, the impressive degree of cross-border coordination seen during the global financial crisis has been reduced to inconsistent -- and at times contradictory -- national responses.

This worrisome trio of increasingly ineffective national and global policy stances, intense political polarization and growing social pressures speaks to the risk that the economy's recent soft patch will evolve into something even more troublesome and sinister."

Friday, 27 August 2010

The Rabid Capitalist Spirit of the English Premier League

Ohhh baby - the football season has begun. Over at Sports Illustrated, Johnathan Wilson tackles the perennial question about the huge competitive gap between the top and bottom of the English Premier League:
"Watch the television coverage of any English Premier League game between a side near the top of the table and a side near the bottom and you can guarantee that before kickoff one of the pundits will say something along these lines: "The great thing about this league is that on any given day anybody can beat anybody." Except it's not true, not anymore.

This isn't U.S. sports with a franchise system, salary caps, drafts and collective negotiating for TV rights that help to ensure general equality and thus competitiveness. This is the dog-eat-dog, every-man-for-himself European model, in which the big boys beat up the little kids on a regular basis."
Waitaminute: salary caps, collective negotiation, and general equality? That's not the American capitalist way! A dog-eat-dog, every-man-for-himself European model? Is this the twilight zone? Or could it be that the English take an "American" approach to sport, whilst the Americans prefer the heavily-regulated "European" way?

I know: that just blew your minds.

Thursday, 26 August 2010

The Annals of Linguistic Trainwrecks: Liberaltarianism

As if it wasn't confusing enough already. 

As if it wasn't bad enough that the word "liberal" means something entirely different on one side of the Atlantic than it does on the other, leading to no end of confusion. Now they've come up with "liberaltarianism." This concoction is meant to denote a fusion (confusion?) between liberal and libertarian thought. As a phrase, "liberaltarianism" does not roll so much as it lurches off your tongue before shuddering and collapsing on to the carpet in a heap.

I'll admit that I'm rather new to this "liberaltarianism" thing. Scott Sumner sums it up thusly:

"Liberaltarianism is basically libertarians attempting to knock some sense into liberals on economic issues."
He then proceeds to lay out some examples of successful bouts of "sense-knockings:" eliminating wage and price controls, lower marginal tax rates for the rich, reducing government involvement in industry. 

I would view each of these examples as a generally positive development. Even what Sumner views as "setbacks" - for example the US government bailout/takeover of General Motors - are exceptions that prove the rule. GM is set to return to public financial markets shortly and the government's stake should be sold off in the next year or so. Even "liberal" governments now rightly accept that they should not be in the business of making automobiles.

But then I made a fatal mistake: I scrolled down to the comments section on Sumner's post. The very first commenter points out that, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, laissez faire used to be the norm and the recent "victories" Sumner describes cannot undo the damage of decades of Liberal Big Government. This is infuriatingly wrongheaded. As Sumner rightly retorts, this laissez faire period was absolutely miserable. In addition to implicitly condoning rampant inequality, economic policy was often guided by a sort of moral puritanism which viewed the suffering of the working class as good for them.

Quite simply, that period's approach to laissez faire capitalism was unsustainable. It was precisely this model that millions of people revolted against, turning to communism or fascism as an escape. Modern day capitalism is softer (although the degree to which it is softer varies across Europe, North America, and Asia). By offsetting the harsh realities of capitalism with a stronger safety net and progressive redistribution, contemporary capitalism has succeeded in neutering many of the harshest criticisms against it. 

To a certain extent, bigger governments are the product of greater wealth. Rich societies inevitably demand greater government involvement since, as wealth increases, so do expectations regarding standards of living. For examples, one need only look to capitalist Hong Kong, where welfare benefits far surpass those in communist mainland China. There is absolutely no good reason why wealthy countries should tolerate the levels of depravity suffered by those living in the glory days of laissez-faire.  

But this is not a one-sided dynamic. The success of the social safety net is itself contingent upon the success of the capitalist model. It is not possible to continue to raise living standards without economic growth, and economic growth requires a free market. If government growth outpaces the economy, a painful re-adjustment will inevitably follow (viz. modern day United Kingdom).

To sum up: there is a mutual dependency at work here. One cannot long survive without the other. Despite its clunkiness, the concept of liberaltarianism seems to capture this understanding fairly well.

Unfortunately, finding the balance between the two is supremely complex. The sheer number of variables at play is overwhelming, and there are always unintended consequences. Designing policy in liberal democratic capitalist societies is bloody difficult, and our ongoing struggles with macroeconomic policy making is evidence of this. Of course, this is also what makes it so fascinating to nerds such as myself.  

This is also why, dear readers, the next time you hear someone pining for the laissez faire days of yore, you should hit them over the head with a stick.

Wednesday, 25 August 2010

Readables

- California moves closer to paying bills with IOUs and monopoly money

- By now you have likely heard about China's epic week-long traffic jam. Maybe they should be taking driving lessons from this guy.

- John Kemp: buying into tail risk will slowly bleed your wealth; instead, buy insurers who sell tail risk

- Argentina's President accuses domestic newsmedia organizations of crimes against humanity

- Can trade liberalization reduce gender inequality?

- Book review of Sebastian Mallaby's review of the hedge fund industry: More Money Than God

Monday, 23 August 2010

One-handed economists only, please

Mike Moffat at WCI takes a stab at explaining why there is such a disconnect between what economists think and what people think economists think. In sum:


"The economists who stay on the air tend to be the ones who are most willing to promote a black/white worldview. That tends to skew the view of the general public, as most economists tend to see everything in shades of grey."

This is pretty much what I was arguing when I referred to the "Richard Dawkins Effect" on the likes of Paul Krugman and others. Nuanced argument isn't entertaining. The one-handed economist rules the roost.

But is that always the case?

It seems to me that what may hold true for talking heads on the radio and Tee Vee doesn't always hold true in the blogosphere. Sure, you can find your fair share of biased blowhards, but it strikes me that many of the most prominent economist bloggers are able to carry out interesting and stimulating discussions on important topics without resorting to brow-beating. The discussion is more "academic" in the positive, constructive sense of the term. What's more, this debate is very accessible to the public.

An interesting sub-question would therefore be: why does this nuanced debate seem to thrive on the internets, but not in the traditional media?

I do think Mike is wrong about the benefits of media exposure, however. For instance, in the United States, if you're a prominent economist-blogger you can apparently be invited to lambaste US Treasury officials in person - which is both fun and intellectually stimulating!

Friday, 20 August 2010

Malaysia: loosening the ringgit fence

Malaysia's currency - the ringgit - soared yesterday after the central bank announced that it was easing restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. The changes allow the ringgit to be used to pay for cross-border trade and eliminate the 12-month limit on currency hedging by domestic firms.

This is good news for Malaysian exporters and, by extension, Malaysia itself.  Despite the encouraging news that Malaysia's economy expanded by 8.9% last quarter, the country is still heavily reliant on exports - primarily commodities and electronics. Exports depend upon foreign demand, and that demand is far from guaranteed. Although the majority of Malaysia's exports go to China, most of these are in turn re-exported to EU and US markets. Thus, even today, the discouraging news about the latter's economic fortunes has tempered yesterday's enthusiasm for the ringgit. 

Until 2005, the ringgit was pegged to the US dollar. The peg acted as a de facto hedge for domestic exporters. The peg is particularly helpful for commodity exporters since commodity markets are inherently volatile and tend to be priced in dollars anyway. Since 2005, however, export-oriented businesses have been subject to the spasmatic re-adjustments that come with a "managed" floating exchange rate operating in the post-Bretton Woods international financial system.

All of which points to the need for Malaysian exporters to be free to effectively manage risk by hedging their contracts to compensate for the ups and downs of global currency markets.

(source: Yahoo)

All the more fitting, too, that in Malay the word ringgit means "jagged." 

Wednesday, 18 August 2010

"Chez Economia: Fine Post-Recessionary Cuisine"




the table d'hote

~~~~~~~

Excite

Contagion crackers, topped by a widening corporate bond spread, with sliced mango and rocket

or


Fat cat paté, bailed out in a white truffle suspension
 Fluid

Cream of sovereign credit rating
or

A complex of derivatives floating in cheap liquidity

Consume
Maplewood-smoked fiscal hawk in a deficit reduction, nestled in chopped public services, shiitake soy emulsion and an aggression of snail

or

Half-baked stimulus, coddled too-big-to-fail quail egg, presented in a bed of seasonal helicopter-dropped greens
Finale
Double-dip chocolate biscuits in austerity pudding, with a selection of Boston "Hahbah" teas

or

Puffed public sector pastry in a caramel debt explosion, with a chapeau of crumbled GDP growth and a raspberry garnish

~~~~~~
Bon appétit!

Tuesday, 17 August 2010

Wherein I discover, to my great suprise and horror, that a Dutch economist is biased

Germany is not China, or so Heleen Mees is eager to point out.

And quite right to do so, I might add. Aside from shared membership in the United Nations and their local Tuesday night 10-pin bowling league, the list of similarities between the two industrious nations is rather short. But on the surface, the two countries share a particularly poignant economic indicator: massive current account surpluses.

In fact, it is precisely by exporting far more goods and services than they import that both Germany and China have vaulted to the front page of the financial news in recent days. Germany, for its whopping 2.2% quarterly economic growth; and China, for (more or less) overtaking Japan as the world's 2nd largest economy.

It is now increasingly clear that the problem of global macroimbalances has returned with a vengeance. At first glance, both Germany and China's export-fueled growth appears to be making these imbalances worse, not better. But this is where Ms. Mees takes over, insisting that there are important differences between the two countries, not least in their capital accounts:
"... Germany did not accumulate foreign reserves the way that China did. On the contrary, German foreign reserves actually declined between 2000 and 2008. Whereas China is a large net recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), Germany is a large net exporter of FDI. China’s net FDI inflow totaled $94 billion in 2008, compared to Germany’s net FDI outflow of $110 billion.

... German’s surplus is thus less damaging than China’s, as it is used for investments that foster productivity gains, economic growth, and job creation – and that often include technology transfers that help to develop human capital.

The Chinese surplus, on the other hand, being heavily skewed towards US government bonds, primarily boosts personal consumption – a process whose apotheosis came in the early 2000’s, as the Bush administration’s tax cuts, together with cash-out home refinancing and home-equity loans, turned US sovereign debt into consumer credit."

This is well-trodden ground: the Chinese proclivity towards saving resulted in having their hard-earned yuan recycled as a US consumer credit boom. According to Mees, the earnings from German GDP were largely recycled into foreign direct investment into neighbouring countries, which is productive. So: China surplus bad; German surplus good. Got it?

But then I keep reading:

"Of course, the demand generated by Chinese credit also fosters economic growth, but mostly in China, owing to booming exports to the US."

Erm, what? This is starting to smell like bullshit. Mees appears to be arguing that the Chinese current account surplus is "damaging" because the economic benefits were only seen in China. Why on earth would that matter?

Ah, but I forgot the part about Chinese savings helping to create a credit boom in the debt-laden United States. The credit boom, in turn, inflated asset bubbles that eventually had to burst. That's what makes the Chinese surplus so damaging and the German one so constructive.

Isn't that right? Ms. Mees? Oh, you're not finished:

"It is, of course, unfortunate that German banks and pension funds lent money to debt-laden countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal on overly favorable terms, inflating asset bubbles that eventually had to burst."

Yea, you're right: Germany is definitely not China.

Monday, 16 August 2010

Readables

- 21st Century monetary policy - Steve Waldman proposes an alternative to tax and interest rate adjustments in response to the business cycle: flat rate cash transfers directly in to people's bank accounts.
- On the usefulness of cash prizes to stimulate innovation
- A post about financial economics that includes a comic strip and a penis joke: this is why we enjoy FT Alphaville so

- "Do not be alarmed if South Africans announce that they were held up by robots" and other, um, helpful multicultural tips from the United Kingdom

- A history of the tomato. For reals.

Thursday, 12 August 2010

The sharpest thing I've read all week

From Matt Yglesias:

"In 2010, of course, we’re not going to go communist. Which is nice. But if you tell people that high unemployment is going to exist for a long long time, and there’s nothing the government can or will do about it, then of course people are going to support policies that make the economy less flexible and less open to imports and foreigners. If laid-off workers can’t find new jobs, then protecting incumbent sites of employment from competition becomes priority number one.

It’s true that if you adopt this view you do need to give up some libertarian purism. If periodic state intervention is required for the purposes of macroeconomic stabilization then you legitimize state intervention to, for example, help poor people. But the battle for that kind of purism is lost anyway. What you gain by embracing stabilization policy and treating the political problems of how to do it effectively as a problem to be solved rather than a reason not to try is an account of why it is that 9.5 percent unemployment doesn’t discredit the underlying principles of a market economy." (emphasis original)


I've pursued a similar line of thinking before, so I'm obviously open to having Matt's arguments reinforce my own.

Elsewhere, Tyler Cowen points out that there are benefits to a period of economic "re-calculation" which need to be recognized as well.

"1) The Industrial Revolution also was a tough slog for quite a few decades. Yet it was both worthwhile and it gave capitalism a bad name for a long time.

2) Alexander Field argues that the Great Depression brought greater productivity improvements than any other decade in U.S. history...."


While I doubt that Tyler is attempting to downplay the pain of the "dislocations" in question, I certainly would not be as cavalier about the consequences. In addition to bringing greater productivity improvements, the turmoil of the Great Depression helped spread political ideologies which were leveraged to support despotic regimes and also gave rise to geopolitical instabilities that dragged the world into an all-consuming war. That is not a fair trade.


But I exaggerate: it's 2010 and we're not going communist.


Nevertheless, it is no longer a (politically) acceptable line of argument to say: "Hey! you've gone down an economic corridor that is no longer promising so you will have to endure a period of recalculation. Good luck with that." Unlike the Industrial Revolution and other recessions of the late 19th and early 20th C, the political systems of the Western world are far more sensitive to this dislocation of workers. We now have universal suffrage and an increasingly educated population with greater opportunities for political voice.


Yes, it's true that the social safet net eases the pain of dislocation (while simultaneously creating its own set of incentives). It's also true that, as Felix Salmon points out, most Americans are now middle class, and most middle class Americans are doing okay. But there is still a significant underclass that is not doing okay and - if the recalculation argument is correct - they may be in for a long haul.


Which brings us back to Matt's point. The plight of the long-term unemployed is fundamentally a political problem, and a messy one at that. But it is only through embracing it as such, and setting about finding ways to mitigate its impact, that we avoid the craziest and nuttiest of outcomes.

Friday, 6 August 2010

Readables

1) The globalization of whisky markets, (not) continued - Chavez' currency crackdown hurts whisky sales. Fine by me, retorts Chavez: "Rich people are lazy and almost all of them spend every day drinking whisky." I think he's been watching too much Mad Men.

2) Thank Goodness It's Thursday - Hawaii cuts the school year by a fifth, Colorado Springs plunges into the dark, and other stories from the Great Recession. As a colleague of mine pointed out, somehow all of this is tolerated in lieu of even a discussion about raising taxes. Update: Illinois has been forced to feature in adult films to make ends meet.

3) The Topic of Cancer - "In whatever kind of a “race” life may be, I have very abruptly become a finalist."

4) Gone 'till November - Wyclef Jean to run in Haitian presidential elections this November.

5) The Sauna World Championships - The Finns are weird.