Thailand has been a country in turmoil since the temporary military coup in 2006, but events have peaked in recent weeks. The country's troubles relate directly to two popular themes here at IPE Journal: the link between democracy & capitalism and economic crises.
The Thai people are currently facing two unpalatable alternatives. On the one hand, the current Prime Minister, Samak Sundaravej, is a rural populist with a sharp tongue that has not been particularly effective since being elected about 18 months ago. Moreover, his cabinet, which includes many members of the previously-deposed government of Thaksin Shinawatra, hardly inspires confidence. His government has been labelled "a shambolic misadventure" by the Bangkok Post, given its failure to deal with the deteriorating economy, food price inflation and a radicalized opposition. But in all likelihood, the alternative is worse.
The rioting and protesting of the past week has been spearheaded by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). Despite it's name, the PAD seeks a regression of democratic rights: resenting populist governments that cater to the urban poor, this group wants to limit voting, reduce the number of elected representatives to 30 and allow the rest to be appointed by business and trade organizations. Yikes. The Economist editorial staff refer to the PAD leadership as "[a] gruesome bunch of reactionary businessmen, generals and aristocrats." But what's even more worrisome is that the PAD has the support of elements of the urban middle class. This, as Gideon Rachmond points out, is yet another qualifier for the overly-simplistic theory that the rise of the middle class will necessarily lead to more democratic reform - something we have discussed before with respect to China. The fact is, ineffective or otherwise, Mr. Samak was elected in a reasonably democratic election. He should be "un-elected" only if and when the population has had enough.
A second, and related, problem facing Thailand is the economy. With the political turmoil exacerbating an economy already weakened by slowing export revenues, the Thai stock market has tumbled to a 19-month low. This economic downturn risks spreading to other East Asian markets, some of which are already showing worrying similarities with the trends that led up to the economic meltdown ten years ago. This may not be the doomsday scenario it appears to be from the headlines, but the volatile mix of political instability and economic weakness in a country as significant as Thailand is something to keep an eye on.
(For possible implications for the USD, see Rory's post below; thanks for the pointer, M)
Friday, 5 September 2008
Thursday, 4 September 2008
Wow
An incredible chart via FT Alphaville shows that the spreads on Iraqi bonds are narrower than those of Ohio, USA banks Keycorp and National City. That's right folks, Iraqi bonds are now safer investments than two major US regional banks.

Still further evidence that the credit crunch is far from over.
This also speaks to the truly remarkeable progress made in Iraq over the past 18 months. An Iraq in recovery is something we can all get behind.
Wednesday, 3 September 2008
Look abroad
I resigned myself at the outset of IPE Journal from discussing the political back and forth of the US presidential election. This site is mainly dedicated to the commanding heights of the global economy, plus it is difficult to comment on partisan politics without some degree of bias or emotion.
But this morning I was watching CNN and a discussion on Sarah Palin's international experience/exposure (Palin is the Vice Presidentail nominee of the Republican party). Host Soledad O'Brien asked a panel of commentators whether Palin's complete lack of international exposure was a problem for a person possibly one heartbeat away from the most powerful job in the world. The two Republican analysts naturally bobbed and weaved. O'Brien pushed on relentlessly, asking how someone who didn't have a passport until 2007 (let me repeat that...didn't have a passport until 2007) could be qualified to be the commander in chief.
The Republican analysts finally argued that it didn't matter if she been abroad (beyond a trip to Kuwait to visit Alaskan National Guard troops), the majority of people in Scranton, PA hadn't either. Neither had most in Dayton, OH.
It is one thing to play politics, to cover for a candidate's glaring international ignorance by claiming she has foreign policy experience because...wait for it...Alaska is close to Russia. It's another to applaud that shameful fact as a virtue, a political strength.
David Gergen (advisor to President's Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Clinton, and one of the most respected voices in US politics) looked at his fellow panelists in shock. Gergen, in his typical measured tone, responded that it was completely unnacceptable for a candidate to be so unaware of the rest of the world. That when only 20% of US citizens own a passport, it is a national problem worth solving, not celebrating.
A Roper/National Geographic poll in 2006 found that 63% of Americans aged 18-24 couldn't locate Iraq on a map. 38% thought speaking another language was "not too important". While only 20% of all American's owned a passport, approximately 40% of Canadians and Europeans did.
Many American's are just uninformed. The American media virtually ignores the rest of the world. Many others do not have the financial means to travel abroad. But too many American's believe that what happens outside of the US doesn't matter to their daily lives or interests. Worse, many simply don't care.
In an interconnected and globalized world, America will suffer if its citizens continue to believe that the world ends at the Atlantic and Pacific. An ignorance of international affairs is shameful for the most powerful nation on earth. Such ignorance by the potential President of the United States is nothing short of dangerous.
Gergen won the argument on CNN with one point (and I'm paraphrasing): every President in modern American history had traveled (many lived) extensively abroad before running for the office, except one. George W. Bush. How'd that work out for everyone?
But this morning I was watching CNN and a discussion on Sarah Palin's international experience/exposure (Palin is the Vice Presidentail nominee of the Republican party). Host Soledad O'Brien asked a panel of commentators whether Palin's complete lack of international exposure was a problem for a person possibly one heartbeat away from the most powerful job in the world. The two Republican analysts naturally bobbed and weaved. O'Brien pushed on relentlessly, asking how someone who didn't have a passport until 2007 (let me repeat that...didn't have a passport until 2007) could be qualified to be the commander in chief.
The Republican analysts finally argued that it didn't matter if she been abroad (beyond a trip to Kuwait to visit Alaskan National Guard troops), the majority of people in Scranton, PA hadn't either. Neither had most in Dayton, OH.
It is one thing to play politics, to cover for a candidate's glaring international ignorance by claiming she has foreign policy experience because...wait for it...Alaska is close to Russia. It's another to applaud that shameful fact as a virtue, a political strength.
David Gergen (advisor to President's Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Clinton, and one of the most respected voices in US politics) looked at his fellow panelists in shock. Gergen, in his typical measured tone, responded that it was completely unnacceptable for a candidate to be so unaware of the rest of the world. That when only 20% of US citizens own a passport, it is a national problem worth solving, not celebrating.
A Roper/National Geographic poll in 2006 found that 63% of Americans aged 18-24 couldn't locate Iraq on a map. 38% thought speaking another language was "not too important". While only 20% of all American's owned a passport, approximately 40% of Canadians and Europeans did.
Many American's are just uninformed. The American media virtually ignores the rest of the world. Many others do not have the financial means to travel abroad. But too many American's believe that what happens outside of the US doesn't matter to their daily lives or interests. Worse, many simply don't care.
In an interconnected and globalized world, America will suffer if its citizens continue to believe that the world ends at the Atlantic and Pacific. An ignorance of international affairs is shameful for the most powerful nation on earth. Such ignorance by the potential President of the United States is nothing short of dangerous.
Gergen won the argument on CNN with one point (and I'm paraphrasing): every President in modern American history had traveled (many lived) extensively abroad before running for the office, except one. George W. Bush. How'd that work out for everyone?
Faster, Higher, Stronger
In a previous post I discussed the recent rise of the US dollar. A number of factors have converged to support the greenback's reversal, and on a technical basis key resistance points have been breached in recent trading. Some reacted to my prediction of a sustained dollar rally with understandable skepticism. However, the past few weeks have reaffirmed the trends I believe will support a strong dollar. A few key points:-The long commodities/short financials trade the fueled the speculative bubble is rapidly unwinding. This has weakened commodity currencies like the Aussie and Kiwi dollar, and seen a surge of money back into the greenback. The record losses of hedge funds in 2008 are directly tied to this trade. While I support the view that rising commodity prices are mainly attributed to fundamental shifts in supply/demand/capacity, financial speculation has clearly generated the froth. I believe the fundamentals support $100 oil, but $140 was all about the hot money.
-The US pleasantly surprised with a revised 3.3% Q2 GDP growth (although some are questioning the credibility of this figure). The expansion was mainly driven by exports, which have surged on the back of a weak dollar. While a strengthening dollar will nudge down exports levels, a measured increase in domestic consumption should keep the US economy above water in Q3 (fiscal stimulus typically takes 2 quarters to fully work its way through the real economy).
-Europe is on the brink of a formal recession, and according to Alastair Darling, economic conditions in the UK are the worst since WWII (how's that for confidence!). Sterling's slide continues, hitting its weakest level since the Euro's introduction in 1999, while the dollar reached an eight month high against the common currency in today's trading.
-Finally, the risk of at least one currency crisis in Asia has increased this week. There are reports that a number of central banks intervened to support their currencies (Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines). The conditions in Asia are uncomfortably similar to 10 years ago (although granted, large FX reserves and better financial supervision have countries like S. Korea better positioned to withstand a run). South Korea has already fired a warning shot to speculators, and the IMF publicly weighed in today in support of the won. With the political situation in Thailand deteriorating by the minute, it could well be the first shoe to drop...just like in 1997. Needless to say, expect a flight to safety ($).
No one should expect the dollar to hit the stratosphere any time soon. But a measured, sustained rise looks even more likely now than it did at the beginning of last month.
Tuesday, 2 September 2008
On Russia, Part I: investment climate
As readers of IPE Journal will know, I am fascinated by Russia (see here). The geopolitical and economic implications of Russia’s rise are immense, and its actions are both bold and confusing. This is the first in a series of pieces on the implications of Russia’s resurgence. Part I: Russia’s investment climate.The Russian investment climate has been shaped by a number of startling developments over the past five years. The Yukos affair, re-nationalization of strategic industries such as energy, questionable legal proceedings against foreign energy companies operating Russian oil and gas fields, and most recently the deterioration of the TNK-BP joint-venture have all increased uncertainty over the integrity of Russian contracts and vulnerability of assets to expropriation. The 2005 “gas war” between Russia and Ukraine signalled to many the political levers behind the commercial actions of state-run companies like Gazprom. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s verbal assault on Mechel Co. (the Russian steel maker) last month knocked $6bn off of its market cap in mere hours of trading. And just last Monday, Russian authorities formally sanctioned the British Chief Executive of the TNK-BP joint-venture.
However, Russia has been a top destination of foreign direct and portfolio investment. FDI has grown over 800% since 2002. By 2006 it accounted for over 3% of GDP (comparable to China). From 2005-2006, net capital inflows rose sharply from $300m to $40bn.
There are a number of explanations for the increase in capital inflows in spite of rapidly rising political risk. Russia’s economic fundamentals are sound, growth large, external debt low, and foreign exchange reserves the third largest in the world ($58bn). Additionally, its capital markets (particularly corporate bond markets) are underdeveloped, and thus foreign investors provide the bulk of corporate finance to Russian companies. Finally, low real interest rates in the U.S. and Japan have driven capital into emerging markets in search of higher returns, and Russia has been among the best performing markets in recent years.
But Russian military action in Georgia appears to have finally reversed
investor sentiment. Chris Palmer, head of emerging markets at UK fund manager Gartmore, says, “Absolutely the worst thing that can happen to a political economy is that it is involved in any kind of military activity”. Since the beginning of August, the RTS index (Russian benchmark equity index) has fallen 18.2%, including a 6.6% drop on the day President Medvedev recognized the breakaway provinces. Russia’s central bank reports that the country lost $16bn in foreign capital following the incursion into Georgia, the largest and most rapid withdrawal since the 1998 crisis. August also brought the largest monthly decline in the ruble in almost a decade. Perhaps most important to the real economy, Fitch said last week that rising tensions between Russia and the West could significantly undermine corporate borrowing conditions.
This dramatic reversal signals that foreign investor perceptions have finally converged with the actual level of political risk in the Russian economy. According to Keynes, investor confidence is largely based on the assumption that present circumstances will continue unchanged into the future. In other words, perception (not probability) drives the risk tolerance of foreign investors. For years investors have been willing to swallow a higher risk premium because Russian performance was high. But Russia’s military actions have altered this risk calculation, and the potential for political isolation has injected even greater uncertainty into capital allocation.
The negative impact of declining investor sentiment on Russian growth is likely significant. Deteriorating corporate borrowing conditions will hit Russian companies hard. As Patrick at Zeitgeist noted yesterday, the financial interests of the Russian elite are not served by poor corporate performance. However, the Kremiln has yet to demonstrate a willingness to adjust policy in reponse to declining investor sentiment. Even in the energy sector, where foreign capital and expertise is critical to upstream production, the Kremlin has pushed ahead with its aggressive expropriation and nationalization agenda.
Therefore, with the stand-off between Russia and the West unlikely to diminish any time soon (more on this to come), the Russian investment climate will be among the more immediate casualties of the escalating tensions. It will be interesting to see if Russia turns East for long-term corporate finance (to SWF’s and Chinese banks), and whether the economic policy divisions between the liberals around Medvedev and the Silvoki under Putin will burst into the public. Russia’s vast foreign exchange reserves will undoubtedly cushion it from any short-term risks. But the lack of a developed corporate finance market and banking sector will heighten the long-term impact of capital outflows. While the West has struggled to respond to Russia’s resurgence, foreign investors have cast their judgment.
There are a number of explanations for the increase in capital inflows in spite of rapidly rising political risk. Russia’s economic fundamentals are sound, growth large, external debt low, and foreign exchange reserves the third largest in the world ($58bn). Additionally, its capital markets (particularly corporate bond markets) are underdeveloped, and thus foreign investors provide the bulk of corporate finance to Russian companies. Finally, low real interest rates in the U.S. and Japan have driven capital into emerging markets in search of higher returns, and Russia has been among the best performing markets in recent years.
But Russian military action in Georgia appears to have finally reversed
investor sentiment. Chris Palmer, head of emerging markets at UK fund manager Gartmore, says, “Absolutely the worst thing that can happen to a political economy is that it is involved in any kind of military activity”. Since the beginning of August, the RTS index (Russian benchmark equity index) has fallen 18.2%, including a 6.6% drop on the day President Medvedev recognized the breakaway provinces. Russia’s central bank reports that the country lost $16bn in foreign capital following the incursion into Georgia, the largest and most rapid withdrawal since the 1998 crisis. August also brought the largest monthly decline in the ruble in almost a decade. Perhaps most important to the real economy, Fitch said last week that rising tensions between Russia and the West could significantly undermine corporate borrowing conditions.This dramatic reversal signals that foreign investor perceptions have finally converged with the actual level of political risk in the Russian economy. According to Keynes, investor confidence is largely based on the assumption that present circumstances will continue unchanged into the future. In other words, perception (not probability) drives the risk tolerance of foreign investors. For years investors have been willing to swallow a higher risk premium because Russian performance was high. But Russia’s military actions have altered this risk calculation, and the potential for political isolation has injected even greater uncertainty into capital allocation.
The negative impact of declining investor sentiment on Russian growth is likely significant. Deteriorating corporate borrowing conditions will hit Russian companies hard. As Patrick at Zeitgeist noted yesterday, the financial interests of the Russian elite are not served by poor corporate performance. However, the Kremiln has yet to demonstrate a willingness to adjust policy in reponse to declining investor sentiment. Even in the energy sector, where foreign capital and expertise is critical to upstream production, the Kremlin has pushed ahead with its aggressive expropriation and nationalization agenda.
Therefore, with the stand-off between Russia and the West unlikely to diminish any time soon (more on this to come), the Russian investment climate will be among the more immediate casualties of the escalating tensions. It will be interesting to see if Russia turns East for long-term corporate finance (to SWF’s and Chinese banks), and whether the economic policy divisions between the liberals around Medvedev and the Silvoki under Putin will burst into the public. Russia’s vast foreign exchange reserves will undoubtedly cushion it from any short-term risks. But the lack of a developed corporate finance market and banking sector will heighten the long-term impact of capital outflows. While the West has struggled to respond to Russia’s resurgence, foreign investors have cast their judgment.
Labels:
energy,
foreign investment,
Russia
Sunday, 31 August 2008
The Health of the Dragon
I am sad to say that on Wednesday I will be leaving my adopted city of London, England to return home to Canada - airline bankruptcy notwithstanding. The sheer volume of chores and partying to be accomplished between now and then is impressive indeed, so that means I'll be leaving these pages in Rory's care until the end of the week.In the meantime, here's some food for thought on China's domestic situation. Arvind Subramanian argues that China may have better prospects for future growth than India due to the latter's declining state infrastructure. This is an interesting article overall, but a couple of issues deserve to be raised. For instance, Arvind argues that:
There are few examples of countries that have grown as strongly and for such long periods as India and China have – 6% and 10%, respectively, for nearly three decades – and then suffered a sharp slowdown or collapse. If history is a reliable guide, then barring major upheavals, economic growth looks likely to continue in both countries until some threshold level of prosperity is attained.I'm sorry, but there are many people living in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea that would respectfully disagree. The fact that the East Asian crisis is only ten years old makes this statement all the more shocking. After literally three decades of what the World Bank deemed "miraculous" growth, each of these countries faced the prospect of negative growth following enormous outflows of capital in 1997-8; Indonesia even underwent a regime change. Perhaps that's an exception to the historical trend but it's certainly worth acknowledging. And yes, China was spared from this crisis largely due to its tight restrictions on investment, but the China of today is considerably more open, not least due to its recent accession to the WTO. The very same factors which Mr. Subramanian argues lead to a virtuous cycle of investment can lead to the reverse should circumstances change.
And indeed, according to S&P/Citigroup BMI Global Index, this year the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have been about as economically buoyant as literal bricks. Not encouraging, but perhaps only temporary.
Also, a good friend has pointed me to a good video summary of the challenges facing China by Shaun Breslin of the University of Warwick (thanks Manoli). Some highlights:
- Communism has been replaced by nationalism/patriotism
- We're seeing the implementation of "illiberal liberalism"
- Wealth in China has increased at a phenomenal rate, but so has inequality.
- Health care is harder to come by in some parts of China than in the 1970s
- It's entirely possible that the narrative will not be that of an emerging superpower, but that of economic collapse.
- How the government reacted to the recent earthquake vis-a-vis the SARS epidemic suggested there has been a greater effort to re-attach the party to the people
- The Chinese government has a long track record of dealing with difficult challenges not unlike those it faces today.
- If this film is anything to go by, one should not study film at the University of Warwick.
Friday, 29 August 2008
Bull Bust
A Financial Times analysis has found that Merrill Lynch's losses over the past 18 months are equal to a quarter of the profits (adjusted for inflation) made in its 36 years as a listed company. This little fact is a compelling statement on the severity of the credit crunch, and on the continuing vulnerability of major financial firms.On this measure, Merrill Lynch is by far the sickest patient of the crisis. The FT article cited an issue I discussed recently, the failure of the integrated banking model, as a major factor in Merrill's meltdown. Complex structured products and cheap leverage created a massive securitization business that produced record profits over the past decade.
But, much like UBS, Merill Lynch's core competency was never investment banking. Its brokerage business was the bread and butter of "Mother Merrill". As Merrill swelled, so did its reliance on securitization and cheap internal credit to fuel profits. As the typical story goes, when the market crashed Merrill was left holding billions in worthless assets. It ditched the girl it brought to the dance for the most popular girl in the room, and when the music stopped, it was left alone in the parking lot.
Stan O'Neal at Merrill was one of the chief protagonists of what has been called the "gung-ho, risk-taking culture" that ruled Wall Street and the City of London. Since O'Neal's departure, John Thain has struggled to pick up the pieces, and every time Merrill looks like it may be turning a corner, another massive writedown is taken. Merrill is a prime example of the excesses, poor risk-management, and lax oversight the defined the past decade in finance.
The discussion on Merrill offers me the chance to briefly revise my earlier discussion on the death of the financial supermarket. My previous post neglected to focus on the lax management and regulation that is really to blame for the credit crunch. Securitization went wild because it was allowed to. Perverse incentives, reckless monetary policy, and a regulatory orthodoxy that fuelled (rather than tempered) asset bubbles created the music to which Chuck Prince and others kept "dancing". Risk management became virtually non-existent.
The integrated-banking model does not inherently promote reckless lending and risk-taking. Financial firms will always expand (irrationally, no doubt) into new, profitable, and complex businesses. But a regulatory environment that stems the inevitable excesses before they infect the financial system and real economy will go a long way towards breaking the practices that contributed to the current crisis.
FYI: Stan O'Neal received a reported $159 million golden parachute upon his firing. Not bad for ruining one of the largest financial firms in the world...
Thursday, 28 August 2008
Creative Destruction: Airline Edition
Joseph Schumpeter popularized the expression "creative destruction" to describe the process whereby entrepreneurs use innovation to drive the economy forward, destroying the value of established companies along the way.For instance, companies like IBM and Polaroid used to dominate their respective markets but have since fallen by the wayside as innovation, competition and technology changes the landscape of the market. Creative destruction also serves as a great euphemism for academics to justify the real-life carnage left in the wake of a competitive economy.
The latest victim of creative destruction (and high fuel prices) is Zoom Airlines, a low-budget carrier similar to Ryanair and EasyJet, which declared bankruptcy this afternoon. As Steve Maich so aptly puts it: "Zoom...splatt." Steve is probably right: Zoom was a crappy airline and the fact that it was unable to secure financing for its future suggests that the company got selected out of the evolutionary process for a reason.
But let me tell you, as the owner of a now-worthless seat on a Zoom flight booked for next Wednesday: this sucks. A lot. I am experiencing first hand the 'destruction' side of things and it is unpleasant. I imagine it's even more unpleasant for the firm's employees and those currently stranded in airport terminals across the globe. I suspect the 'creativity' half refers mainly to the range of obscenities being directed towards Zoom Airlines, airport staff, oil companies, and the gods.
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(Fun Fact: Creative destruction was a strong contender for the title of this blog, but Rory and I decided that IPE Journal was much more exciting...)
Those Cheeky Elites
I will rarely venture to comment on the US election, mostly because I'm completely unqualified. But since there's a strong chance that I'll get to vote before my American friends and this topic applies to both sides of the border, here it goes.
The electoral politics of elitist-bashing has reared its ugly head once again, but this time with a twist: it's the Republican Party under attack. John McCain's personal wealth is such that he owns a number of houses, some for personal use, others for investment purposes. There are seven or eight or maybe ten homes, but the best part is that McCain can't remember. Given the current housing crisis in the US, the Obama campaign has understandably jumped on this gaffe and has been hammering on about just how out of touch and elitist McCain is from "regular" Americans. Obama, by contrast, only owns one house - he is therefore a man of the people. Nick Lembo finds this kind of politicking despicable; Paul Krugman thinks it's silly, but also necessary.
I don't want to talk about houses, but the elitist debate more generally. Ezra Klein points out that the election has now moved into a space where each side is trying to frame the other elitist:
Backing me up on this point is one of America's premier political commentators: Jon Stewart. This is a little old, but his rant (about 7:20 in) is dead on. Enjoy.
The electoral politics of elitist-bashing has reared its ugly head once again, but this time with a twist: it's the Republican Party under attack. John McCain's personal wealth is such that he owns a number of houses, some for personal use, others for investment purposes. There are seven or eight or maybe ten homes, but the best part is that McCain can't remember. Given the current housing crisis in the US, the Obama campaign has understandably jumped on this gaffe and has been hammering on about just how out of touch and elitist McCain is from "regular" Americans. Obama, by contrast, only owns one house - he is therefore a man of the people. Nick Lembo finds this kind of politicking despicable; Paul Krugman thinks it's silly, but also necessary.
I don't want to talk about houses, but the elitist debate more generally. Ezra Klein points out that the election has now moved into a space where each side is trying to frame the other elitist:
Obama... is elite. As in "A group or class of persons enjoying superior intellectual, social, or economic status." Obama isn't an economic elite, but he is a social and intellectual elite. And it's that creeping sense that he's different, that he's better and knows it, that McCain is trying to exploit.The Obama campaign, similarly, has realized that McCain is an elite, and that voters won't believe that a guy who has so many houses that he can't keep track of them will care if they lose the small condo they call home. This election, in other words, is becoming a contest to decide which type of elite voters hate -- [0]r fear, or mistrust -- more: A social elite or an economic elite?
Let me make this very clear: I want the elite running my country. I want the most elite of the elitist community. I want the one the elite look at and say: "Wow, I thought I was elite, but that person is... wow." I'm not talking about elite in the sense of being born into the right families, but rather in the meritocratic sense. If the candidate for the highest political office in the land was top of the class at one of the best universities, or was successful enough that he can afford multiple properties, or whatever - then that's a good thing. I want a leader who is both the smartest person in the room and wealthy enough so that concerns about financial security never cross his/her mind - not even once. If I see a campaign slogan that reads: "Vote X: I'm just as smart and qualified as you!" then I'm packing my things.
Backing me up on this point is one of America's premier political commentators: Jon Stewart. This is a little old, but his rant (about 7:20 in) is dead on. Enjoy.
Wednesday, 27 August 2008
Water-blogged
Hi. My name is Rory. I used to roam these fine pages before I got caught up in one of the slowest moving tropical storms in recorded U.S. history. As you might have guessed, twenty-five inches of rain is not conducive to blogging, or dry feet.
It is nice to be back.
It is nice to be back.
Decisions, Decisions
In the off chance that you've been living with penguins in Antarctica for the past year or so and haven't heard the news: the US is having an election in a couple of months. Now it is looking increasingly likely that we Canadians will also get the chance to exercise our democratic privileges. Hooray! Now we can show the Russians and Chinese how it's done.
But who to vote for? It's a difficult decision - all sides have their merits and their faults. Do you know where you stand on all the issues? Do you vote for the candidate, the party or the platform? So many options, only one vote.
Well, you can stop your fretting. Science is reporting that the decision may have already been made for you: by your brain. It may not have told you it's decision yet, but chances are it has already made up its... er, mind on the major issues. If this study can be generalized, then it casts a shadow over all the campaign efforts made to win over the "undecideds."
Please don't read this as an endorsement for willful ignorance on all things politics - citizens still need to educate themselves on the actual policies of the candidates/parties before they can make a decision - but it's interesting all the same.
But who to vote for? It's a difficult decision - all sides have their merits and their faults. Do you know where you stand on all the issues? Do you vote for the candidate, the party or the platform? So many options, only one vote.
Well, you can stop your fretting. Science is reporting that the decision may have already been made for you: by your brain. It may not have told you it's decision yet, but chances are it has already made up its... er, mind on the major issues. If this study can be generalized, then it casts a shadow over all the campaign efforts made to win over the "undecideds."
Please don't read this as an endorsement for willful ignorance on all things politics - citizens still need to educate themselves on the actual policies of the candidates/parties before they can make a decision - but it's interesting all the same.
Tuesday, 26 August 2008
Authoritarian Fries?

By most accounts the Beijing Olympics were seen as a successful "coming out party" for China, demonstrating strong elements of patriotism/nationalism, superior organizational capacity, and the ability to raise armies of gymnastic prodigies. Not to be outdone, Russia invaded a country. Both events are displays of strength from the West's old Cold War foes and both have led to a renewed debate over threats to the Western system of liberal democratic capitalism. It's not capitalism that's being challenged, but rather the predominance of the liberal democratic system.
For example, Robert Reich - US Secretary of Labor - laments that we've been gravely mistaken if we think capitalism and democracy go hand in glove:
Economic reforms are well underway in China. Individual Chinese can own property and invest, trade and buy almost whatever they want. Private enterprise is in, collectives are out. But when it comes to civil and political rights, China today is where it was almost two decades ago at the time of Tiananmen Square.Similarly, Arthur Kroeber suggests that we are not going to see an epic struggle between the middle class and elites in China because both groups benefit from the current arrangement and fear the instability democracy will likely bring. In other words, democracy needs to prove itself to the Chinese and it hasn't done that yet. More importantly, economic liberalization is not going to do the job. (See also the Zeitgeist take on things).
I think both of these authors are partly right. It's certainly true that liberal economic reform in no way requires a liberal democratic system to be initiated: Pinochet demonstrated this quite clearly in Chile during the 1970s. But can this be sustained? I don't think so.
You won't often find me agreeing with the likes of Hayek and Friedman, but I make an exception on some topics. Capitalism is rooted in individual liberties and freedoms, which means that the capitalist system cannot last long under a strong authoritarian regime - one will have to give way eventually. (I say "strong" authoritarianism because the "soft" variety, characteristic of East Asia's economic growth until the mid-1990s, is a different situation that requires a separate post entirely).
Perhaps I'm being naive about the sustainability of authoritarianism, but when I look at the regimes in China, Russia and Saudi Arabia I see both strength and vulnerability. Russia's resurgence is contingent upon oil & gas revenues and is hardly creating a sustainable investment environment. China's breakneck growth rates may be keeping the middle class happy for now, but what happens when (not if) this pace drops? Comparing national opinion poles, as Reich does, is not an accurate gage of the state of China's authoritarian capitalism. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is struggling to diversify its economy beyond oil revenues and will face a messy power struggle once the last of King Saud's sons dies off.
Remember the 1980s when we thought Japanese investors were going to buy up every North American company and we'd all be doing calisthenics during the office lunch hour? Me neither, I was a toddler; but I'm told it was the case. But it didn't quite turn out that way after the Japanese entered a decade-long recession. Of course, history never repeats itself exactly, but I think we should be cautious about jumping to conclusions over the viability of authoritarian capitalism. Expect more on this topic soon.
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