A little while back I wrote a tongue-in-cheek post about the curious effects of globalization on the market for scotch. The increased wealth and subsequent demand for luxury goods in East Asia, it seemed, was causing the price of scotch in North America to rise and the selection to fall.
There were several reasons for this, including: the sheer size and rapid growth of the market for luxury goods in Asia, higher margins for scotch producers & distributors, and - as was my guess - less competition from similar liquors that could act as substitutes for scotch (like whisky, bourbon, rye, etc.).
Sure enough, I arrived at the Singapore Changi international airport yesterday and a quick scan of the duty free shop* supports the theory: the liquor section is dominated primarily by a lot (a lot!) of high-end scotches, as well as cognac, wine and some champagne. There is far less competition from your usual suspects of rums, ryes, vodkas, gins, and the like.
This is a place, in other words, that has its priorities straight.
-----------------------
*I recognize that a duty free shop in an airport is not accurate guage of what a regular liquor store will carry. But that is sort of the point: it caters to the wealthier crowd that can afford to travel or do business in and around the region. I suspect, however, that the inventory in duty free stores is dictated by a wider variety of considerations than simply consumer demand, so it will be worth finding a liquor store in a wealthy part of town to do a comparison.
Saturday, 10 July 2010
Tuesday, 6 July 2010
Readables
- The great risk rebalancing
- Thoughtful arguments in favour of cosmopolitan eduation, from the point of view of an American
- "A nuclear explosion over the leak," he says nonchalantly puffing a cigarette as he sits in a conference room at the Institute of Strategic Stability, where he is a director. "I don't know what BP is waiting for, they are wasting their time. Only about 10 kilotons of nuclear explosion capacity and the problem is solved." Here.
- Whisky: a liquid investment (har har)
- Iran lectures Canada on human rights following the G20 summit. I have no words.
- 100 greatest movie insults. Redundant Warning: salty language
- Thoughtful arguments in favour of cosmopolitan eduation, from the point of view of an American
- "A nuclear explosion over the leak," he says nonchalantly puffing a cigarette as he sits in a conference room at the Institute of Strategic Stability, where he is a director. "I don't know what BP is waiting for, they are wasting their time. Only about 10 kilotons of nuclear explosion capacity and the problem is solved." Here.
- Whisky: a liquid investment (har har)
- Iran lectures Canada on human rights following the G20 summit. I have no words.
- 100 greatest movie insults. Redundant Warning: salty language
Monday, 5 July 2010
Paul Krugman and the Richard Dawkins effect
I don't read Paul Krugman anymore.
Actually, that's not technically true: over Christmas I read through his book on the recent financial crisis. This is partly because Krugman has a rare gift for making economic concepts accessible to the lay reader: it's hard to find anyone who can write a book that explains the complexities of the financial crisis as lucidly as he does.
But I don't read Paul Krugman the blogger/op-edder anymore. This is not because I'm not open to his ideas, or that I don't think he has anything important to say - it's more because I feel that I already know what he's going to say.
You see, I fear that the blogger Krugman is no longer contributing nuanced ideas to the debate over economic policy. Rather, he has developed a set of positions and has chosen to simply bang on about them repeatedly. It is as though he has given up on his academic roots to become a mere public pundit for a particular point of view. The debate is over; all that's left is to convince the other side that your side is right.
He has, in other words, become the Richard Dawkins of the macroeconomy debate. Both are very clever and accomplished academics who have contributed original and valuable insights into their respective fields of study. Both have since taken up positions of being public spokespersons for controversial topics. And both are increasingly one-sided and uncompromising in their views. They have become almost a caricature of the viewpoints they espouse. Indeed, Krugman seems to have become more a slogan-generating-machine than anything else.
And it's entertaining stuff, no doubt. This sort of approach is great for running up blog traffic and book sales. However, I'm willing to bet that most people who read Paul Krugman do so to either a) reinforce their own preconceptions and feel better about themselves, or b) find a reason to get really angry. Ditto for Richard Dawkins, by the way.
The unfortunate bit about all of this is that anyone who is genuinely interested in a nuanced discussion about the economy and public policy must look elsewhere. As a case in point, the Economist's latest lead article is on the debate over government austerity measures. Krugman is mentioned in the piece as being a leading figure of the anti-austerity crowd, but is criticized for his "crude Keynesianism." Krugman's responsive post was entitled "I’m Gonna Haul Out The Next Guy Who Calls Me “Crude” And Punch Him In The Kisser." This, despite the fact that the article actually sides more closely with his point of view than the austerity folks.
Like I said, I get it: Paul's being funny and hyperbolic and whimsical. This is entertaining to read. But it doesn't actually address the issue. By focusing who is being labelled as what, who is on which side of the debate and who is falling victim to latest playful slogan that he's come up with, Krugman is reducing the quality of the debate as opposed to enhancing it. What a shame.
Actually, that's not technically true: over Christmas I read through his book on the recent financial crisis. This is partly because Krugman has a rare gift for making economic concepts accessible to the lay reader: it's hard to find anyone who can write a book that explains the complexities of the financial crisis as lucidly as he does.
But I don't read Paul Krugman the blogger/op-edder anymore. This is not because I'm not open to his ideas, or that I don't think he has anything important to say - it's more because I feel that I already know what he's going to say.
You see, I fear that the blogger Krugman is no longer contributing nuanced ideas to the debate over economic policy. Rather, he has developed a set of positions and has chosen to simply bang on about them repeatedly. It is as though he has given up on his academic roots to become a mere public pundit for a particular point of view. The debate is over; all that's left is to convince the other side that your side is right.
He has, in other words, become the Richard Dawkins of the macroeconomy debate. Both are very clever and accomplished academics who have contributed original and valuable insights into their respective fields of study. Both have since taken up positions of being public spokespersons for controversial topics. And both are increasingly one-sided and uncompromising in their views. They have become almost a caricature of the viewpoints they espouse. Indeed, Krugman seems to have become more a slogan-generating-machine than anything else.
And it's entertaining stuff, no doubt. This sort of approach is great for running up blog traffic and book sales. However, I'm willing to bet that most people who read Paul Krugman do so to either a) reinforce their own preconceptions and feel better about themselves, or b) find a reason to get really angry. Ditto for Richard Dawkins, by the way.
The unfortunate bit about all of this is that anyone who is genuinely interested in a nuanced discussion about the economy and public policy must look elsewhere. As a case in point, the Economist's latest lead article is on the debate over government austerity measures. Krugman is mentioned in the piece as being a leading figure of the anti-austerity crowd, but is criticized for his "crude Keynesianism." Krugman's responsive post was entitled "I’m Gonna Haul Out The Next Guy Who Calls Me “Crude” And Punch Him In The Kisser." This, despite the fact that the article actually sides more closely with his point of view than the austerity folks.
Like I said, I get it: Paul's being funny and hyperbolic and whimsical. This is entertaining to read. But it doesn't actually address the issue. By focusing who is being labelled as what, who is on which side of the debate and who is falling victim to latest playful slogan that he's come up with, Krugman is reducing the quality of the debate as opposed to enhancing it. What a shame.
Sunday, 27 June 2010
Spain's political economy: Piquanté
Poor Spain. The euro-crisis spotlight has slowly been shifting from Greece to its much larger and more economically significant Iberian neighbour. Although nowhere near as fiscally irresponsible as Greece, Spain is still smarting from a massive housing bubble blow-up and nearly 20% unemployment. Overall debt to GDP is a reasonable 60%, but much of this is owed to external creditors. Moreover, the annual deficit is closer to 11%, which raises questions about the near-term sustainability of its economic situation. What we've seen elsewhere is that this uncertainty alone is enough to create its own problems.
But even in the face of such half-hearted protests, it's unclear how far Zapatero's government is willing to go. Elected with a left-leaning mandate, they have been reluctant to cut back government benefits and create a more competitive labour market, caving only in the face of potential financial sector chaos. Moreover, according to some of the locals in Madrid who I spoke with, domestic support for the government is very low. The opinion polls seem to support this. Although the opposition is benefiting from the unpopularity of the austerity measures, according to the (tiny) sample I spoke to, few people think they would do a better job.
All of this suggests that the economy of Spain is facing a grim time ahead, full of uncertainty. For the biggest Spanish banks, the publication of the results of the central bank's stress tests and their ongoing access to the FROB may be enough to calm jittery investors in the short term. I suspect, however, that the stress tests on Spain's reluctant government and the ECB have only just begun.
First, the private sector. Because of this "uncertainty" and their heavy exposure to bad loans in the property sector, Spanish banks have seen their access to wholesale funding markets dry up. In fact, Spanish banks broke an ECB borrowing record last month, suggesting that they are heavily reliant on government financing for their liquidity. Recognizing the dire situation facing its banks, the Spanish government set up the FROB last year to assist with debt restructuring. More recently, the Banco d'Espagna is attempting to stop the panic before it starts through the publication of so-called stress tests of Spanish banks.
In all likelihood, the tests will reveal that Spain's largest banks are quite solvent, thank you very much. The chief of Santander, Spain's largest bank, certainly thinks so (although he would say that, wouldn't he?). The solvency of two other large banks, BBVA and La Caixa, will probably also be demonstrated by the tests. But solvency isn't the issue; liquidity is. Until investors are convinced that Spain is not going the way of Greece, their banks will struggle to access funding.
Which brings us to the public sector. In my view, there is likely a greater danger facing Spain's national balance sheet than for its banks and corporations. This is in part because of the combination of problems facing the nation and the fact that Spain has been slow to demonstrate its resolve in addressing them. Perhaps reflecting this, the spreads are wider on Spanish government debt than on Banco Santander and a large Spanish telecoms firm.
As noted above, the combination of nearly 20% unemployment and an 11% deficit represents a particularly acute problem for the government. After several meetings with the ECB and other European leaders, Spain's leadership has finally acknowledged the severity of the situation and is acting accordingly: austerity measures have been introduced, including cuts to public sector pay and pensions, and the government just recently decreed reforms for the labour market, which the Spanish parliament has since ratified.
Predictably, the public sector union staged protests in response to the cuts. I was in Barcelona for the June 8th protests (see photo below), and had several impressions. First, the protests were quite civilized - certainly nothing compared to the earlier madness in Athens. But they were also quite tame. Indeed, according to The Economist, the turnout was far lower than the numbers threatened by the public sector union.

As noted above, the combination of nearly 20% unemployment and an 11% deficit represents a particularly acute problem for the government. After several meetings with the ECB and other European leaders, Spain's leadership has finally acknowledged the severity of the situation and is acting accordingly: austerity measures have been introduced, including cuts to public sector pay and pensions, and the government just recently decreed reforms for the labour market, which the Spanish parliament has since ratified.
Predictably, the public sector union staged protests in response to the cuts. I was in Barcelona for the June 8th protests (see photo below), and had several impressions. First, the protests were quite civilized - certainly nothing compared to the earlier madness in Athens. But they were also quite tame. Indeed, according to The Economist, the turnout was far lower than the numbers threatened by the public sector union.
But even in the face of such half-hearted protests, it's unclear how far Zapatero's government is willing to go. Elected with a left-leaning mandate, they have been reluctant to cut back government benefits and create a more competitive labour market, caving only in the face of potential financial sector chaos. Moreover, according to some of the locals in Madrid who I spoke with, domestic support for the government is very low. The opinion polls seem to support this. Although the opposition is benefiting from the unpopularity of the austerity measures, according to the (tiny) sample I spoke to, few people think they would do a better job.
All of this suggests that the economy of Spain is facing a grim time ahead, full of uncertainty. For the biggest Spanish banks, the publication of the results of the central bank's stress tests and their ongoing access to the FROB may be enough to calm jittery investors in the short term. I suspect, however, that the stress tests on Spain's reluctant government and the ECB have only just begun.
Friday, 25 June 2010
Annnnnnnnnd we're back!
I have to say, even a mild case of vacation is enough to make returning to regular blogging extremely difficult. Add to that the G8/G20 summit that is currently consuming my work life and the Greatest Single Sporting Event Known to Man consuming the rest, the blog has been thoroughly neglected. I see that some poor confused souls have continued to check for updates during my absence, but despair not: we're back in action.
Thursday, 27 May 2010
IPE Journal visits The Land of the PIGS
Not content to be a mere armchair pundit for the happenings and goings-on of the global economy, your intrepid correspondent is going to be traveling to the heart of the financial turmoil, the eye of the storm, the Land of the PIGS.
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone claim - with a dramatic flair - that the impending euro crisis that originated in these European countries will lead us down the road to economic serfdom. Years of imprudent fiscal management has created a mountain of debt which, when combined with reckless short-term politicking by Europe's political elite, threatens to collapse the modern welfare system as we know it and send shock waves through the global economy.
I doubt it. But in order to find out more, I will be spending the next couple of weeks exploring a few of these countries, talking to locals about their views on sovereign debt, credit rating agencies, monetary policy, Bundestag politicians, and... oh hell, who am I kidding? I'm going to be sitting on a beach, sipping wine and looking for a Bernini sculpture that I can pick up on the cheap once the euro goes down the crapper.
See you in a few weeks.
Simon Johnson and Peter Boone claim - with a dramatic flair - that the impending euro crisis that originated in these European countries will lead us down the road to economic serfdom. Years of imprudent fiscal management has created a mountain of debt which, when combined with reckless short-term politicking by Europe's political elite, threatens to collapse the modern welfare system as we know it and send shock waves through the global economy.
I doubt it. But in order to find out more, I will be spending the next couple of weeks exploring a few of these countries, talking to locals about their views on sovereign debt, credit rating agencies, monetary policy, Bundestag politicians, and... oh hell, who am I kidding? I'm going to be sitting on a beach, sipping wine and looking for a Bernini sculpture that I can pick up on the cheap once the euro goes down the crapper.
See you in a few weeks.
Monday, 24 May 2010
It's Regulatory Culture, Stupid
There's a lot of interesting activity these days with respect to reforming financial regulation and oversight. On one side of the pond, the US Senate just approved a "far reaching" regulatory bill, which, if stitched together with the House of Reps version, could mean big changes are coming to Wall Street. Meanwhile, on the other side of the pond, the United Kingdom's new Coalition Government of Everlasting Friendship seems set to push forward with reform of its own.
Commentary abounds on both of these projects, but I would merely point to two articles: the first by Clive Crook on the US Senate bill; the second by Howard Davies and David Green (both formerly of the Financial Services Authority) on the situation in the UK.
To set the stage, Davies and Green make a truly important point:
"Any objective assessment of regulatory structures around the world during the crisis would find little or no relationship between structure and success."
This is exactly right. We'll come back to that in a second. They continue:
"But we can draw three lessons from the crisis. First, the central bank needs good information about the financial system as a whole. Second, there is an argument for a second tool for the central bank to influence credit conditions. And third, the case for integrated regulation has been strengthened."
The second tool being referred to is the anomalous "macroprudential regulation" - the idea being that measures which would fall under this category (raising capital requirements, modify mortgage requirements, whatever else) might have a similar impact on the supply of credit as would changing the interest rate. It therefore makes sense to have them considered together. Okay, I'm convinced.
But under what structure? Davies and Green think that both should be under the roof of the central bank. Another possibility is the one proposed in the US Senate finance bill: create a financial stability oversight council. The council would consist of the most senior representatives from a whole range of government departments and agencies, including Treasury, the Fed, FDIC, the SEC, the new consumer protection agency, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. In theory, interest rate decisions could be discussed alongside a whole range of financial policy considerations: fiscal policy, mortgage regulations, competition concerns, you name it. Get all the key players in the same room, the thinking goes, and problems can be identified and solved in a more coordinated manner.
Clive Crook dismisses this council idea as a weak solution. To be sure, it has not done anything to simplify the messy spiderweb that is financial regulation in the United States. On the other hand, a similar committee exists in Canada, a country widely praised of late for having weathered the financial storm quite nicely - maybe it could work in the US as well?
This is where we return to the opening statement from Davies and Green: there is no link between structure and success. Regulatory structure can be, at best, a facilitator; at worst, a barrier. I suspect that this council will only be as effective as its members allow it to be. An ineffective council would merely result in the status quo. Anything beyond the status quo is progress. Viewed that way, there is a lot of scope for this council to demonstrate its value in heading off future financial crises.
Nevertheless, I am increasingly of the view that who is sitting around the table matters more than the shape of the table*, so to speak. People matter. Regulatory culture matters. And that, unfortunately, is not something which can be legislated.
---------------------------------------------
*It could very well be that I'm being heavily influenced by the book I am currently reading, Liaquat Ahamed's excellent Lords of Finance, which tells the story of the world's four most influential central bankers in the run-up to the Great Depression.
Friday, 21 May 2010
Quote of the Day
While I continue to work on a (slightly) more detailed post about the recent US Senate bill on finance reform, I wanted to share this quote, via James Kwak. It's from Steve Waldman at Interfluidity and it gives some sense of the challenges faced by those who wish to prevent a repeat of our latest banking meltdown:
Now, try explaining that to the general public. It's no wonder that people have attached themselves to a bank tax - it's simple. The reality, however, is not.
"Capital does not exist in the world. It is not accessible to the senses. When we claim a bank or any other firm has so much ‘capital’ we are modeling its assets and liabilities and contingent positions and coming up with a number. Unfortunately, there is not one uniquely ‘true’ model of bank capital. Even hewing to GAAP and all regulatory requirements, thousands of estimates and arbitrary choices must be made to compute the capital position of a modern bank. There is a broad, multidimensional ‘space’ of defensible models by which capital might be computed. When we ‘measure’ capital, we select a model and then compute. If we were to randomly select among potential models (even weighted by regulatory acceptability, so that a compliant model is much more likely than an iffy one), we would generate a probability distribution of capital values. That distribution would be very broad, so that for large, complex banks negative values would be moderately probable, as would the highly positive values that actually get reported. . . . Given the heterogeneity of real-world arrangements, no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model can be legislated or regulated to ensure a consistent capital measure. We cannot have both free-form, ‘innovative’ banks and meaningful measures of regulatory capital."
Now, try explaining that to the general public. It's no wonder that people have attached themselves to a bank tax - it's simple. The reality, however, is not.
Wednesday, 19 May 2010
Readables
- Revelations about Japan's large political slush fund result in suspiciously little attention from the nation's media.
- The economics of the National Hockey League- The outgoing UK Secretary of the Treasury has a laugh. "Ha. Ha... no, seriously: the country is broke."
- India is planning $50 billion in road projects- The shared agenda of Gorbachev and Medvedev
- Revaluation of the Chinese yuan has been put on hold. Blame the Europeans.
- Counterfeit bananas
Thursday, 13 May 2010
Golf, China, English, Twitter
The WSJ has an interesting article on the golf course industry in China. I discovered this via a link in FT's Beyond Brics which asks:
"Golf in China - under par?"
Which in turn leads me to ask this question:
"Why does "under par" or "sub-par" mean something is less good or less-than-average when in golf it means the opposite? In a reference to an article about golf, no less"
I suspect that Twitter was invented to answer this very question.
"Golf in China - under par?"
Which in turn leads me to ask this question:
"Why does "under par" or "sub-par" mean something is less good or less-than-average when in golf it means the opposite? In a reference to an article about golf, no less"
I suspect that Twitter was invented to answer this very question.
Tuesday, 11 May 2010
Tuesday Readables
- "The industrial world will be in fiscal consolidation mode by this time next year.... There is no hiding place for anybody." Ah Willem, how we missed you! Videos of his talk last week at CFR available here.
- How are the world's markets doing, you ask? Why, check out the map in the top right-hand corner of our new favourite blog!
- The British Election, Summarized (Part II): "Nnnyaaaaaghwooohaaooooororarararararghhhhhhh. That's the message the electorate gave on Thursday. A long, angry, discordant noise that eventually became silly. Hence the result." That's Armando Iannucci, the director of the brilliant political satire film In The Loop.
- Dept. of I Knew That Already: "There is a correlation between how much money people make and how happy they are. But, what really seems to explain people's life satisfaction is not the particular amount of money they make, but how their income compares to what their peer group makes." Lesson: spend more time around unsuccessful people.
Monday, 10 May 2010
Scattered Lunchtime Thoughts on the Euro
1. Last Thursday, when the crisis of confidence in European sovereign debt led to a sharp dip in the markets, many emerging market economies suffered as investors fled to safety (USD, YEN). This was particularly the case in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asian economies (ex-Japan). Today, the announcement of a super-massive Euro-bailout led markets in emerging economies to rebound strongly, particularly in risky asset classes. None of this is suprising. But it does drive home the point that Greece's problems are not merely a danger to Europe, but to much of the world economy. This is particularly the case for emerging markets that are heavily-reliant on foreign financing to sustain their growth.
2. It will be interesting to see if they will act upon this realization and use Greece as leverage to push for reforms at the IMF and World Bank that would give them more say in future bail-out decisions.
3. Nassim Taleb must be giddy with glee.
4. I agree with Tyler Cowen's assessment that "[t]he major European powers would not have come up with a nearly $1 trillion bailout, also involving de facto loss of ECB independence, unless they were scared ****less."
5. In the 1920s, the expert opinion of central bankers, Treasury officials, leading newspapers and many in the financial sector was that the world must return to the gold standard. Yes, there would be painful austerity and increased unemployment, but it was inconceivable that the global economy could function without the link to gold. They were wrong: clinging to gold did more harm than good.
Now we hear from many euro-politicians and eurocrats that "It is inconceivable that Greece leaves the euro." The consequences would indeed be dire. But I fear the option is dismissed out of hand because of some mental block that prevents people from even considering the possibility. This phenomenon could be termed "euro-fetters" or the "euro-mentalité" (with apologies to Barry Eichengreen). Let's be clear: a country leaving the euro is still an option, and for Greece it may even be a desirable one.
2. It will be interesting to see if they will act upon this realization and use Greece as leverage to push for reforms at the IMF and World Bank that would give them more say in future bail-out decisions.
3. Nassim Taleb must be giddy with glee.
4. I agree with Tyler Cowen's assessment that "[t]he major European powers would not have come up with a nearly $1 trillion bailout, also involving de facto loss of ECB independence, unless they were scared ****less."
5. In the 1920s, the expert opinion of central bankers, Treasury officials, leading newspapers and many in the financial sector was that the world must return to the gold standard. Yes, there would be painful austerity and increased unemployment, but it was inconceivable that the global economy could function without the link to gold. They were wrong: clinging to gold did more harm than good.
Now we hear from many euro-politicians and eurocrats that "It is inconceivable that Greece leaves the euro." The consequences would indeed be dire. But I fear the option is dismissed out of hand because of some mental block that prevents people from even considering the possibility. This phenomenon could be termed "euro-fetters" or the "euro-mentalité" (with apologies to Barry Eichengreen). Let's be clear: a country leaving the euro is still an option, and for Greece it may even be a desirable one.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)