Wednesday, 25 August 2010
Readables
- By now you have likely heard about China's epic week-long traffic jam. Maybe they should be taking driving lessons from this guy.
- John Kemp: buying into tail risk will slowly bleed your wealth; instead, buy insurers who sell tail risk
- Argentina's President accuses domestic newsmedia organizations of crimes against humanity
- Can trade liberalization reduce gender inequality?
- Book review of Sebastian Mallaby's review of the hedge fund industry: More Money Than God
Monday, 23 August 2010
One-handed economists only, please
"The economists who stay on the air tend to be the ones who are most willing to promote a black/white worldview. That tends to skew the view of the general public, as most economists tend to see everything in shades of grey."
This is pretty much what I was arguing when I referred to the "Richard Dawkins Effect" on the likes of Paul Krugman and others. Nuanced argument isn't entertaining. The one-handed economist rules the roost.
But is that always the case?
It seems to me that what may hold true for talking heads on the radio and Tee Vee doesn't always hold true in the blogosphere. Sure, you can find your fair share of biased blowhards, but it strikes me that many of the most prominent economist bloggers are able to carry out interesting and stimulating discussions on important topics without resorting to brow-beating. The discussion is more "academic" in the positive, constructive sense of the term. What's more, this debate is very accessible to the public.
An interesting sub-question would therefore be: why does this nuanced debate seem to thrive on the internets, but not in the traditional media?
I do think Mike is wrong about the benefits of media exposure, however. For instance, in the United States, if you're a prominent economist-blogger you can apparently be invited to lambaste US Treasury officials in person - which is both fun and intellectually stimulating!
Friday, 20 August 2010
Malaysia: loosening the ringgit fence
This is good news for Malaysian exporters and, by extension, Malaysia itself. Despite the encouraging news that Malaysia's economy expanded by 8.9% last quarter, the country is still heavily reliant on exports - primarily commodities and electronics. Exports depend upon foreign demand, and that demand is far from guaranteed. Although the majority of Malaysia's exports go to China, most of these are in turn re-exported to EU and US markets. Thus, even today, the discouraging news about the latter's economic fortunes has tempered yesterday's enthusiasm for the ringgit.
Until 2005, the ringgit was pegged to the US dollar. The peg acted as a de facto hedge for domestic exporters. The peg is particularly helpful for commodity exporters since commodity markets are inherently volatile and tend to be priced in dollars anyway. Since 2005, however, export-oriented businesses have been subject to the spasmatic re-adjustments that come with a "managed" floating exchange rate operating in the post-Bretton Woods international financial system.
All of which points to the need for Malaysian exporters to be free to effectively manage risk by hedging their contracts to compensate for the ups and downs of global currency markets.
(source: Yahoo)
All the more fitting, too, that in Malay the word ringgit means "jagged."
Wednesday, 18 August 2010
"Chez Economia: Fine Post-Recessionary Cuisine"
the table d'hote
~~~~~~~
Excite
Contagion crackers, topped by a widening corporate bond spread, with sliced mango and rocket
or
Fat cat paté, bailed out in a white truffle suspension
Cream of sovereign credit rating
A complex of derivatives floating in cheap liquidity
Consume
or
Half-baked stimulus, coddled too-big-to-fail quail egg, presented in a bed of seasonal helicopter-dropped greens
or
Puffed public sector pastry in a caramel debt explosion, with a chapeau of crumbled GDP growth and a raspberry garnish
~~~~~~
Tuesday, 17 August 2010
Wherein I discover, to my great suprise and horror, that a Dutch economist is biased
And quite right to do so, I might add. Aside from shared membership in the United Nations and their local Tuesday night 10-pin bowling league, the list of similarities between the two industrious nations is rather short. But on the surface, the two countries share a particularly poignant economic indicator: massive current account surpluses.
In fact, it is precisely by exporting far more goods and services than they import that both Germany and China have vaulted to the front page of the financial news in recent days. Germany, for its whopping 2.2% quarterly economic growth; and China, for (more or less) overtaking Japan as the world's 2nd largest economy.
It is now increasingly clear that the problem of global macroimbalances has returned with a vengeance. At first glance, both Germany and China's export-fueled growth appears to be making these imbalances worse, not better. But this is where Ms. Mees takes over, insisting that there are important differences between the two countries, not least in their capital accounts:
"... Germany did not accumulate foreign reserves the way that China did. On the contrary, German foreign reserves actually declined between 2000 and 2008. Whereas China is a large net recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), Germany is a large net exporter of FDI. China’s net FDI inflow totaled $94 billion in 2008, compared to Germany’s net FDI outflow of $110 billion.... German’s surplus is thus less damaging than China’s, as it is used for investments that foster productivity gains, economic growth, and job creation – and that often include technology transfers that help to develop human capital.
The Chinese surplus, on the other hand, being heavily skewed towards US government bonds, primarily boosts personal consumption – a process whose apotheosis came in the early 2000’s, as the Bush administration’s tax cuts, together with cash-out home refinancing and home-equity loans, turned US sovereign debt into consumer credit."
This is well-trodden ground: the Chinese proclivity towards saving resulted in having their hard-earned yuan recycled as a US consumer credit boom. According to Mees, the earnings from German GDP were largely recycled into foreign direct investment into neighbouring countries, which is productive. So: China surplus bad; German surplus good. Got it?
But then I keep reading:
"Of course, the demand generated by Chinese credit also fosters economic growth, but mostly in China, owing to booming exports to the US."
Erm, what? This is starting to smell like bullshit. Mees appears to be arguing that the Chinese current account surplus is "damaging" because the economic benefits were only seen in China. Why on earth would that matter?
Ah, but I forgot the part about Chinese savings helping to create a credit boom in the debt-laden United States. The credit boom, in turn, inflated asset bubbles that eventually had to burst. That's what makes the Chinese surplus so damaging and the German one so constructive.
Isn't that right? Ms. Mees? Oh, you're not finished:
"It is, of course, unfortunate that German banks and pension funds lent money to debt-laden countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal on overly favorable terms, inflating asset bubbles that eventually had to burst."
Yea, you're right: Germany is definitely not China.
Monday, 16 August 2010
Readables
- "Do not be alarmed if South Africans announce that they were held up by robots" and other, um, helpful multicultural tips from the United Kingdom
- A history of the tomato. For reals.
Thursday, 12 August 2010
The sharpest thing I've read all week
"In 2010, of course, we’re not going to go communist. Which is nice. But if you tell people that high unemployment is going to exist for a long long time, and there’s nothing the government can or will do about it, then of course people are going to support policies that make the economy less flexible and less open to imports and foreigners. If laid-off workers can’t find new jobs, then protecting incumbent sites of employment from competition becomes priority number one.
It’s true that if you adopt this view you do need to give up some libertarian purism. If periodic state intervention is required for the purposes of macroeconomic stabilization then you legitimize state intervention to, for example, help poor people. But the battle for that kind of purism is lost anyway. What you gain by embracing stabilization policy and treating the political problems of how to do it effectively as a problem to be solved rather than a reason not to try is an account of why it is that 9.5 percent unemployment doesn’t discredit the underlying principles of a market economy." (emphasis original)
I've pursued a similar line of thinking before, so I'm obviously open to having Matt's arguments reinforce my own.
Elsewhere, Tyler Cowen points out that there are benefits to a period of economic "re-calculation" which need to be recognized as well.
"1) The Industrial Revolution also was a tough slog for quite a few decades. Yet it was both worthwhile and it gave capitalism a bad name for a long time.
2) Alexander Field argues that the Great Depression brought greater productivity improvements than any other decade in U.S. history...."
While I doubt that Tyler is attempting to downplay the pain of the "dislocations" in question, I certainly would not be as cavalier about the consequences. In addition to bringing greater productivity improvements, the turmoil of the Great Depression helped spread political ideologies which were leveraged to support despotic regimes and also gave rise to geopolitical instabilities that dragged the world into an all-consuming war. That is not a fair trade.
But I exaggerate: it's 2010 and we're not going communist.
Nevertheless, it is no longer a (politically) acceptable line of argument to say: "Hey! you've gone down an economic corridor that is no longer promising so you will have to endure a period of recalculation. Good luck with that." Unlike the Industrial Revolution and other recessions of the late 19th and early 20th C, the political systems of the Western world are far more sensitive to this dislocation of workers. We now have universal suffrage and an increasingly educated population with greater opportunities for political voice.
Yes, it's true that the social safet net eases the pain of dislocation (while simultaneously creating its own set of incentives). It's also true that, as Felix Salmon points out, most Americans are now middle class, and most middle class Americans are doing okay. But there is still a significant underclass that is not doing okay and - if the recalculation argument is correct - they may be in for a long haul.
Which brings us back to Matt's point. The plight of the long-term unemployed is fundamentally a political problem, and a messy one at that. But it is only through embracing it as such, and setting about finding ways to mitigate its impact, that we avoid the craziest and nuttiest of outcomes.
Friday, 6 August 2010
Readables
2) Thank Goodness It's Thursday - Hawaii cuts the school year by a fifth, Colorado Springs plunges into the dark, and other stories from the Great Recession. As a colleague of mine pointed out, somehow all of this is tolerated in lieu of even a discussion about raising taxes. Update: Illinois has been forced to feature in adult films to make ends meet.
3) The Topic of Cancer - "In whatever kind of a “race” life may be, I have very abruptly become a finalist."
4) Gone 'till November - Wyclef Jean to run in Haitian presidential elections this November.
5) The Sauna World Championships - The Finns are weird.
Friday, 30 July 2010
Where is the Recovery Going to Come From?
Although the recession probably ended (technically) in the United States sometime last summer, the global recovery - such as it is - seems remarkably fragile. Unemployment is obviously the biggest indicator. German unemployment continues to drop, but in the US the there are some 15 million unemployed, and even more who are underemployed. Nearly half of the unemployed have been off the job for 6 months or more. That's a deep hole. (More charts here)
Moreover, many of the underlying problems have not gone away. Sovereign debt concerns are still a biggy. The collapse of the Eurozone has been staved off through the promise of access to an unprecedented level of EU-backed funds for the weakest members. But most analysts agree that, as far as Greece is concerned, the can has simply been kicked down the road. Only Spain, the UK, and some Baltic states seem to be taking the necessary steps to address the underlying problems. Even there, the steps being taken should raise worry about delaying the recovery even further.
Another underlying problem is that of macroimbalances. Any movement towards re-balancing over the past two years was the result of the peculiarities of the financial crisis. We're seeing quite clearly now that the fundamental asymmetries of the global market for goods & assets have not gone anywhere. Capital flows have started returning to their pre-crisis trends. Moreover, everyone (everyone!) is talking about exporting their way out of recovery.
That is literally not possible. Where is the demand going to come from? US household wealth is low (decimated by decline in housing & job losses), consumer spending is weak, while savings will likely increase. The EU is fragile, and the best-performing country (Germany) is growing from...you guessed it: exports.
What about demand in emerging markets? The biggest, China, is currently trying to delicately apply the brakes to avoid domestic overheating and still does not have sufficient demand to offset the decline in the US/EU. Capital flows into India have slowed in recent months, which restricts their ability to fund further growth and demand. News out Japan is underwhelming.
On top of this, many of the East/Southeast Asian countries that built up their domestic currency reserves during the lead-up to the Great Recession to act as a buffer against crises will feel vindicated: they have fared relatively well. Why on earth would they change strategies now?

As noted below, the fragility of the situation is not lost on Mervyn King, head of the Bank of England. Similarly, US Federal Reserve's beige book recently described a decidedly "beige outlook" for the United States. In fact, even this morning, the estimates of US GDP growth disappointed market watchers.
The only good news I can think of is that we are not hurtling down an economic crevasse. And let's be clear: this is really REALLY good news. Catastrophe was a definite possibility a couple of months ago as observers watched the European sovereign debt problems cause the EZ to teeter on the precipice. But despite their dithering, the euro-zone economies have, for the moment, escaped the worst possible outcomes. The bank stress tests, despite widely reported weaknesses, have been met by a neutral-to-positive response. Tyler Cowen suggests that wages in Europe have been less sticky than he predicted, which seems to be prompting some signs of recovery. Another indicator of uncertainty - both for inflation and deflation - is gold. Gold is holding steady at the moment, suggesting that fear of impending doom is abated.
But if not hurtling down an economic crevasse is the best news you've got, things are still pretty grim. Taking stock of the situation from my little peephole, I have really got to ask myself: where is the recovery going to come from?
UPDATE: Some honesty from Tyler Cowen: "Macroeconomics is rarely simple... We still don't know what we are doing." Read the rest.
Wednesday, 28 July 2010
Wednesday Readables
"The gradual improvement in credit conditions that was evident earlier in the year seems to have come to a halt in recent months. And financial markets more generally have been volatile. In part that is because continuing concerns about the ability of some countries to achieve necessary fiscal consolidation are affecting confidence in the ability of banks to repair their balance sheets. More fundamentally, the key underlying causes of the crisis – in terms of the imbalances in global demand – have still not been tackled. Those imbalances are likely to be larger this year than last, and will probably still be around three-quarters of their level at the peak immediately prior to the crisis. Until these underlying problems are resolved, uncertainty about the outlook for the world economy will remain."(FT Alphaville provides comment)
- Flooding in China pushes the Three Gorges dam ever closer to capacity
- Does happiness affect productivity? Yes. Quality? Not really.
- In praise of Dark Ages
- Catalonia bans bullfighting. Good. I attended a bullfight in Madrid recently - I arrived with what I had hoped was an open mind, willing to make an effort to appreciate this part of Spanish culture. I was left disgusted by what is, essentially, ritualized slaughter for the sake of entertainment. Don't get me wrong: I was impressed by the matadors themselves. Bullfighting clearly requires a great deal of skill and cajones. But so did being a gladiator in ancient Rome. The Italians gave up their bloodthirst many centuries ago. Maybe it's time Spain did the same.
Monday, 26 July 2010
Photo Of The Day: Consequences of Inflation

And I thought it was only Goldman Sachs executives who did that kind of thing...
Saturday, 24 July 2010
Conversations with Taxi Drivers: Singapore
Singapore is an interesting case, to put it mildly. Much of its recent history is a blur, cobbled together from various travelers' notebooks, journals and the occasional scribbled map. For much of the 17th and 18th centuries it was probably uninhabited. As recently as 50 years ago, the place was still a backwater entrepot, with very little in the way of a diverse economy.
Yet in visiting modern Singapore, this is difficult to imagine. The city-state is modern, vibrant, wealthy, and stuffed with the sort of cultural icons we associate with truly global cities. New resorts and theme parks are sprouting up left and right, while international business people continue to arrive in droves to the business district and conference centers. Next month, the city state will be hosting the 2010 Youth Olympics.* And despite a huge number of foreign workers (a million, according to one cabbie), there is a continuing need for more.
Because it is so tiny, Singapore's success has not been able to rely on natural resources or a large labour force to drive its economic growth. Instead, its limited resources have been carefully "channeled" towards certain key areas to create an open and highly competitive economy. What's more, as they are so vulnerable to the shifting economic winds, the city state has been forced to continue to innovate and shift to new areas. For instance, they are now making a concerted effort towards becoming a world leader in biotechnology research, while the financial services sector continues to grow in regional importance. There is also the recently announced launch of the largest power grid research station in Asia. Further examples abound.
Clearly Singapore has had success where other countries in the region have not. So are there lessons to be learned for other emerging markets? Many appear tempted to dismiss Singapore as a "unique case" that is difficult to copy. There are some good reasons for this.
Obviously, it is small. This makes it easier for the government to carefully allocate economic resources. But many other countries are small and fail to achieve something similar. Access to water and its position along a major shipping route clearly helps, but this does not account for the diversity of Singapore's economy. The colonial background has also left its mark on certain ways in which the country functions, notably the legal system.
The stable political situation certainly plays a role. Although the system is nominally a representative democracy, in practice it is a semi-authoritarian one-party state. Freedom House ranks the country as "Partly Free" (up from "Not Free" a little while back) due to what they label as draconian restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly. Yet, according to one senior diplomat here, the system still kind of works. The ruling party is scared of losing power and local government representatives hold regular council meetings wherein residents can air their grievances. Voices are heard, potholes are fixed. The Lion State's size once again makes this a workable option.
So while its true that, in many respects, Singapore is a unique case, this does not mean that its lessons are not transferrable. This is not news to some; China has long been watching its tiny neighbour grow from a poor nation to an immensely prosperous one, looking for hints on how to do the same. I would also wager to guess that a number of the Gulf Emirates have attempted to out-Singapore Singpore - they certainly share an obsession with heavily air-conditioned shopping malls and a need for economic diversification.
But just what kind of lessons are we talking about? To my eyes, one of the most striking things about Singapore is how multicultural it is - there are people living in Singapore from just about every country in the region. What's more, they appear to do so harmoniously. This is something supposedly modern European cities struggle to achieve. My most recent cabbie, of Indian descent, seemed to agree. Despite being a minority, he felt reasonably well represented. For instance, although the Chinese population dominates the government, there are a number of senior ministers with important portfolios who are Indian.
The noticeable exception is the substantial Malay minority who, despite being the indigenous population and still more populous than the Indians, are less well represented in government. They continue to face restrictions on practicing their culture are also economically disadvantaged (although policies are being developed to mitigate this).
But despite this imbalance, things in Singapore are a far cry from the race riots which apparently caused havoc in the slums of Singapore back in the 1960s. One possible explanation for this are the ubiquitous HDB flats, or subsidized housing projects nicknamed after the Housing and Development Board, which oversees them.
Some 85% of Singaporeans live in HDB flats (private property on the island is obscenely expensive). Although some HDBs can themselves still be quite costly, they offer what appears to be an intelligent solution to addressing the imbalance between the wealthy and the poor. For instance, although HDBs are subsidized, they do seem to be mere handouts. There are conditions attached, and there is the possibility for upward mobility if you work hard and achieve economic success. This creates positive incentives for HDB-dwellers, whereas most public housing projects tend to leave their residents to stagnate.
At least that's the theory. Whether this is true in practice, I have no idea. But the results would appear to speak for themselves. It's not for nothing that, as noted above, China has been closely watching the HDB system's progress over the years as it searches for ways to deal with the challenges caused by a huge increase in urban populations.
More importantly, my taxi driver thought the system works pretty well. That's good enough for me.
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*I confess to have never heard of the Youth Olympics before; I felt slightly less stupid upon discovering that this is the very first time such an event has been held. Now ya know.
