Friday, 6 August 2010

Readables

1) The globalization of whisky markets, (not) continued - Chavez' currency crackdown hurts whisky sales. Fine by me, retorts Chavez: "Rich people are lazy and almost all of them spend every day drinking whisky." I think he's been watching too much Mad Men.

2) Thank Goodness It's Thursday - Hawaii cuts the school year by a fifth, Colorado Springs plunges into the dark, and other stories from the Great Recession. As a colleague of mine pointed out, somehow all of this is tolerated in lieu of even a discussion about raising taxes. Update: Illinois has been forced to feature in adult films to make ends meet.

3) The Topic of Cancer - "In whatever kind of a “race” life may be, I have very abruptly become a finalist."

4) Gone 'till November - Wyclef Jean to run in Haitian presidential elections this November.

5) The Sauna World Championships - The Finns are weird.

Friday, 30 July 2010

Where is the Recovery Going to Come From?

Over the past few weeks, my occasional glances at the market reporting pages suggested that there was some positive news to be had. Markets were launching small rallies. There was a return to risky assets. The UK and Germany, among others, were turning out surprisingly positive signs of economic recovery. But upon taking a step back from the day-to-day churn of financial reporting, I have to admit I'm a bit baffled by all of this: where are these positive vibes coming from?

Although the recession probably ended (technically) in the United States sometime last summer, the global recovery - such as it is - seems remarkably fragile. Unemployment is obviously the biggest indicator. German unemployment continues to drop, but in the US the there are some 15 million unemployed, and even more who are underemployed. Nearly half of the unemployed have been off the job for 6 months or more. That's a deep hole. (More charts here)

Moreover, many of the underlying problems have not gone away. Sovereign debt concerns are still a biggy. The collapse of the Eurozone has been staved off through the promise of access to an unprecedented level of EU-backed funds for the weakest members. But most analysts agree that, as far as Greece is concerned, the can has simply been kicked down the road. Only Spain, the UK, and some Baltic states seem to be taking the necessary steps to address the underlying problems. Even there, the steps being taken should raise worry about delaying the recovery even further.

Another underlying problem is that of macroimbalances. Any movement towards re-balancing over the past two years was the result of the peculiarities of the financial crisis. We're seeing quite clearly now that the fundamental asymmetries of the global market for goods & assets have not gone anywhere. Capital flows have started returning to their pre-crisis trends. Moreover, everyone (everyone!) is talking about exporting their way out of recovery.

That is literally not possible. Where is the demand going to come from? US household wealth is low (decimated by decline in housing & job losses), consumer spending is weak, while savings will likely increase. The EU is fragile, and the best-performing country (Germany) is growing from...you guessed it: exports.

What about demand in emerging markets? The biggest, China, is currently trying to delicately apply the brakes to avoid domestic overheating and still does not have sufficient demand to offset the decline in the US/EU. Capital flows into India have slowed in recent months, which restricts their ability to fund further growth and demand. News out Japan is underwhelming.

On top of this, many of the East/Southeast Asian countries that built up their domestic currency reserves during the lead-up to the Great Recession to act as a buffer against crises will feel vindicated: they have fared relatively well. Why on earth would they change strategies now?

As noted below, the fragility of the situation is not lost on Mervyn King, head of the Bank of England. Similarly, US Federal Reserve's beige book recently described a decidedly "beige outlook" for the United States. In fact, even this morning, the estimates of US GDP growth disappointed market watchers.

The only good news I can think of is that we are not hurtling down an economic crevasse. And let's be clear: this is really REALLY good news. Catastrophe was a definite possibility a couple of months ago as observers watched the European sovereign debt problems cause the EZ to teeter on the precipice. But despite their dithering, the euro-zone economies have, for the moment, escaped the worst possible outcomes. The bank stress tests, despite widely reported weaknesses, have been met by a neutral-to-positive response. Tyler Cowen suggests that wages in Europe have been less sticky than he predicted, which seems to be prompting some signs of recovery. Another indicator of uncertainty - both for inflation and deflation - is gold. Gold is holding steady at the moment, suggesting that fear of impending doom is abated.

But if not hurtling down an economic crevasse is the best news you've got, things are still pretty grim. Taking stock of the situation from my little peephole, I have really got to ask myself: where is the recovery going to come from?

UPDATE: Some honesty from Tyler Cowen: "Macroeconomics is rarely simple... We still don't know what we are doing." Read the rest.

Wednesday, 28 July 2010

Wednesday Readables

- Mervyn King warns against getting ahead of ourselves:

"The gradual improvement in credit conditions that was evident earlier in the year seems to have come to a halt in recent months. And financial markets more generally have been volatile. In part that is because continuing concerns about the ability of some countries to achieve necessary fiscal consolidation are affecting confidence in the ability of banks to repair their balance sheets. More fundamentally, the key underlying causes of the crisis – in terms of the imbalances in global demand – have still not been tackled. Those imbalances are likely to be larger this year than last, and will probably still be around three-quarters of their level at the peak immediately prior to the crisis. Until these underlying problems are resolved, uncertainty about the outlook for the world economy will remain."
(FT Alphaville provides comment)

- Flooding in China pushes the Three Gorges dam ever closer to capacity

- Does happiness affect productivity? Yes. Quality? Not really.

- In praise of Dark Ages

- Catalonia bans bullfighting. Good. I attended a bullfight in Madrid recently - I arrived with what I had hoped was an open mind, willing to make an effort to appreciate this part of Spanish culture. I was left disgusted by what is, essentially, ritualized slaughter for the sake of entertainment. Don't get me wrong: I was impressed by the matadors themselves. Bullfighting clearly requires a great deal of skill and cajones. But so did being a gladiator in ancient Rome. The Italians gave up their bloodthirst many centuries ago. Maybe it's time Spain did the same.

Monday, 26 July 2010

Photo Of The Day: Consequences of Inflation

A photo circulating by email around Zimbabwe of a supposed sign along the Zim-South Africa border (from Good Morning Afrika, via Free Exchange):




















And I thought it was only Goldman Sachs executives who did that kind of thing...

Saturday, 24 July 2010

Conversations with Taxi Drivers: Singapore

As I am currently a resident of an airport for the near future, I feel it best to catch up on some long overdue blogging. Having spent the better portion of 2 weeks in Singapore, that seems like as good a topic as any. I don't pretend to have become an expert on the place, but I have picked up a few tidbits which have piqued my interest. Many of these have derived from my favourite source of information: taxi drivers.

Singapore is an interesting case, to put it mildly. Much of its recent history is a blur, cobbled together from various travelers' notebooks, journals and the occasional scribbled map. For much of the 17th and 18th centuries it was probably uninhabited. As recently as 50 years ago, the place was still a backwater entrepot, with very little in the way of a diverse economy.

Yet in visiting modern Singapore, this is difficult to imagine. The city-state is modern, vibrant, wealthy, and stuffed with the sort of cultural icons we associate with truly global cities. New resorts and theme parks are sprouting up left and right, while international business people continue to arrive in droves to the business district and conference centers. Next month, the city state will be hosting the 2010 Youth Olympics.* And despite a huge number of foreign workers (a million, according to one cabbie), there is a continuing need for more.

Because it is so tiny, Singapore's success has not been able to rely on natural resources or a large labour force to drive its economic growth. Instead, its limited resources have been carefully "channeled" towards certain key areas to create an open and highly competitive economy. What's more, as they are so vulnerable to the shifting economic winds, the city state has been forced to continue to innovate and shift to new areas. For instance, they are now making a concerted effort towards becoming a world leader in biotechnology research, while the financial services sector continues to grow in regional importance. There is also the recently announced launch of the largest power grid research station in Asia. Further examples abound.

Clearly Singapore has had success where other countries in the region have not. So are there lessons to be learned for other emerging markets? Many appear tempted to dismiss Singapore as a "unique case" that is difficult to copy. There are some good reasons for this.

Obviously, it is small. This makes it easier for the government to carefully allocate economic resources. But many other countries are small and fail to achieve something similar. Access to water and its position along a major shipping route clearly helps, but this does not account for the diversity of Singapore's economy. The colonial background has also left its mark on certain ways in which the country functions, notably the legal system.

The stable political situation certainly plays a role. Although the system is nominally a representative democracy, in practice it is a semi-authoritarian one-party state. Freedom House ranks the country as "Partly Free" (up from "Not Free" a little while back) due to what they label as draconian restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly. Yet, according to one senior diplomat here, the system still kind of works. The ruling party is scared of losing power and local government representatives hold regular council meetings wherein residents can air their grievances. Voices are heard, potholes are fixed. The Lion State's size once again makes this a workable option.

So while its true that, in many respects, Singapore is a unique case, this does not mean that its lessons are not transferrable. This is not news to some; China has long been watching its tiny neighbour grow from a poor nation to an immensely prosperous one, looking for hints on how to do the same. I would also wager to guess that a number of the Gulf Emirates have attempted to out-Singapore Singpore - they certainly share an obsession with heavily air-conditioned shopping malls and a need for economic diversification.

But just what kind of lessons are we talking about? To my eyes, one of the most striking things about Singapore is how multicultural it is - there are people living in Singapore from just about every country in the region. What's more, they appear to do so harmoniously. This is something supposedly modern European cities struggle to achieve. My most recent cabbie, of Indian descent, seemed to agree. Despite being a minority, he felt reasonably well represented. For instance, although the Chinese population dominates the government, there are a number of senior ministers with important portfolios who are Indian.

The noticeable exception is the substantial Malay minority who, despite being the indigenous population and still more populous than the Indians, are less well represented in government. They continue to face restrictions on practicing their culture are also economically disadvantaged (although policies are being developed to mitigate this).

But despite this imbalance, things in Singapore are a far cry from the race riots which apparently caused havoc in the slums of Singapore back in the 1960s. One possible explanation for this are the ubiquitous HDB flats, or subsidized housing projects nicknamed after the Housing and Development Board, which oversees them.

Some 85% of Singaporeans live in HDB flats (private property on the island is obscenely expensive). Although some HDBs can themselves still be quite costly, they offer what appears to be an intelligent solution to addressing the imbalance between the wealthy and the poor. For instance, although HDBs are subsidized, they do seem to be mere handouts. There are conditions attached, and there is the possibility for upward mobility if you work hard and achieve economic success. This creates positive incentives for HDB-dwellers, whereas most public housing projects tend to leave their residents to stagnate.

At least that's the theory. Whether this is true in practice, I have no idea. But the results would appear to speak for themselves. It's not for nothing that, as noted above, China has been closely watching the HDB system's progress over the years as it searches for ways to deal with the challenges caused by a huge increase in urban populations.

More importantly, my taxi driver thought the system works pretty well. That's good enough for me.


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*I confess to have never heard of the Youth Olympics before; I felt slightly less stupid upon discovering that this is the very first time such an event has been held. Now ya know.

Saturday, 10 July 2010

The Globalization of the Scotch Market, cntd.

A little while back I wrote a tongue-in-cheek post about the curious effects of globalization on the market for scotch. The increased wealth and subsequent demand for luxury goods in East Asia, it seemed, was causing the price of scotch in North America to rise and the selection to fall.

There were several reasons for this, including: the sheer size and rapid growth of the market for luxury goods in Asia, higher margins for scotch producers & distributors, and - as was my guess - less competition from similar liquors that could act as substitutes for scotch (like whisky, bourbon, rye, etc.).

Sure enough, I arrived at the Singapore Changi international airport yesterday and a quick scan of the duty free shop* supports the theory: the liquor section is dominated primarily by a lot (a lot!) of high-end scotches, as well as cognac, wine and some champagne. There is far less competition from your usual suspects of rums, ryes, vodkas, gins, and the like.

This is a place, in other words, that has its priorities straight.


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*I recognize that a duty free shop in an airport is not accurate guage of what a regular liquor store will carry. But that is sort of the point: it caters to the wealthier crowd that can afford to travel or do business in and around the region. I suspect, however, that the inventory in duty free stores is dictated by a wider variety of considerations than simply consumer demand, so it will be worth finding a liquor store in a wealthy part of town to do a comparison.

Tuesday, 6 July 2010

Readables

- The great risk rebalancing

- Thoughtful arguments in favour of cosmopolitan eduation, from the point of view of an American

- "A nuclear explosion over the leak," he says nonchalantly puffing a cigarette as he sits in a conference room at the Institute of Strategic Stability, where he is a director. "I don't know what BP is waiting for, they are wasting their time. Only about 10 kilotons of nuclear explosion capacity and the problem is solved." Here.

- Whisky: a liquid investment (har har)

- Iran lectures Canada on human rights following the G20 summit. I have no words.

- 100 greatest movie insults. Redundant Warning: salty language

Monday, 5 July 2010

Paul Krugman and the Richard Dawkins effect

I don't read Paul Krugman anymore.

Actually, that's not technically true: over Christmas I read through his book on the recent financial crisis. This is partly because Krugman has a rare gift for making economic concepts accessible to the lay reader: it's hard to find anyone who can write a book that explains the complexities of the financial crisis as lucidly as he does.

But I don't read Paul Krugman the blogger/op-edder anymore. This is not because I'm not open to his ideas, or that I don't think he has anything important to say - it's more because I feel that I already know what he's going to say.

You see, I fear that the blogger Krugman is no longer contributing nuanced ideas to the debate over economic policy. Rather, he has developed a set of positions and has chosen to simply bang on about them repeatedly. It is as though he has given up on his academic roots to become a mere public pundit for a particular point of view. The debate is over; all that's left is to convince the other side that your side is right.

He has, in other words, become the Richard Dawkins of the macroeconomy debate. Both are very clever and accomplished academics who have contributed original and valuable insights into their respective fields of study. Both have since taken up positions of being public spokespersons for controversial topics. And both are increasingly one-sided and uncompromising in their views. They have become almost a caricature of the viewpoints they espouse. Indeed, Krugman seems to have become more a slogan-generating-machine than anything else.

And it's entertaining stuff, no doubt. This sort of approach is great for running up blog traffic and book sales. However, I'm willing to bet that most people who read Paul Krugman do so to either a) reinforce their own preconceptions and feel better about themselves, or b) find a reason to get really angry. Ditto for Richard Dawkins, by the way.

The unfortunate bit about all of this is that anyone who is genuinely interested in a nuanced discussion about the economy and public policy must look elsewhere. As a case in point, the Economist's latest lead article is on the debate over government austerity measures. Krugman is mentioned in the piece as being a leading figure of the anti-austerity crowd, but is criticized for his "crude Keynesianism." Krugman's responsive post was entitled "I’m Gonna Haul Out The Next Guy Who Calls Me “Crude” And Punch Him In The Kisser." This, despite the fact that the article actually sides more closely with his point of view than the austerity folks.

Like I said, I get it: Paul's being funny and hyperbolic and whimsical. This is entertaining to read. But it doesn't actually address the issue. By focusing who is being labelled as what, who is on which side of the debate and who is falling victim to latest playful slogan that he's come up with, Krugman is reducing the quality of the debate as opposed to enhancing it. What a shame.

Sunday, 27 June 2010

Spain's political economy: Piquanté

Poor Spain. The euro-crisis spotlight has slowly been shifting from Greece to its much larger and more economically significant Iberian neighbour. Although nowhere near as fiscally irresponsible as Greece, Spain is still smarting from a massive housing bubble blow-up and nearly 20% unemployment. Overall debt to GDP is a reasonable 60%, but much of this is owed to external creditors. Moreover, the annual deficit is closer to 11%, which raises questions about the near-term sustainability of its economic situation. What we've seen elsewhere is that this uncertainty alone is enough to create its own problems.

First, the private sector. Because of this "uncertainty" and their heavy exposure to bad loans in the property sector, Spanish banks have seen their access to wholesale funding markets dry up. In fact, Spanish banks broke an ECB borrowing record last month, suggesting that they are heavily reliant on government financing for their liquidity. Recognizing the dire situation facing its banks, the Spanish government set up the FROB last year to assist with debt restructuring. More recently, the Banco d'Espagna is attempting to stop the panic before it starts through the publication of so-called stress tests of Spanish banks.

In all likelihood, the tests will reveal that Spain's largest banks are quite solvent, thank you very much. The chief of Santander, Spain's largest bank, certainly thinks so (although he would say that, wouldn't he?). The solvency of two other large banks, BBVA and La Caixa, will probably also be demonstrated by the tests. But solvency isn't the issue; liquidity is. Until investors are convinced that Spain is not going the way of Greece, their banks will struggle to access funding.

Which brings us to the public sector. In my view, there is likely a greater danger facing Spain's national balance sheet than for its banks and corporations. This is in part because of the combination of problems facing the nation and the fact that Spain has been slow to demonstrate its resolve in addressing them. Perhaps reflecting this, the spreads are wider on Spanish government debt than on Banco Santander and a large Spanish telecoms firm.

As noted above, the combination of nearly 20% unemployment and an 11% deficit represents a particularly acute problem for the government. After several meetings with the ECB and other European leaders, Spain's leadership has finally acknowledged the severity of the situation and is acting accordingly: austerity measures have been introduced, including cuts to public sector pay and pensions, and the government just recently decreed reforms for the labour market, which the Spanish parliament has since ratified.

Predictably, the public sector union staged protests in response to the cuts. I was in Barcelona for the June 8th protests (see photo below), and had several impressions. First, the protests were quite civilized - certainly nothing compared to the earlier madness in Athens. But they were also quite tame. Indeed, according to The Economist, the turnout was far lower than the numbers threatened by the public sector union.


But even in the face of such half-hearted protests, it's unclear how far Zapatero's government is willing to go. Elected with a left-leaning mandate, they have been reluctant to cut back government benefits and create a more competitive labour market, caving only in the face of potential financial sector chaos. Moreover, according to some of the locals in Madrid who I spoke with, domestic support for the government is very low. The opinion polls seem to support this. Although the opposition is benefiting from the unpopularity of the austerity measures, according to the (tiny) sample I spoke to, few people think they would do a better job.

All of this suggests that the economy of Spain is facing a grim time ahead, full of uncertainty. For the biggest Spanish banks, the publication of the results of the central bank's stress tests and their ongoing access to the FROB may be enough to calm jittery investors in the short term. I suspect, however, that the stress tests on Spain's reluctant government and the ECB have only just begun.

Friday, 25 June 2010

Annnnnnnnnd we're back!

I have to say, even a mild case of vacation is enough to make returning to regular blogging extremely difficult. Add to that the G8/G20 summit that is currently consuming my work life and the Greatest Single Sporting Event Known to Man consuming the rest, the blog has been thoroughly neglected. I see that some poor confused souls have continued to check for updates during my absence, but despair not: we're back in action.

Thursday, 27 May 2010

IPE Journal visits The Land of the PIGS

Not content to be a mere armchair pundit for the happenings and goings-on of the global economy, your intrepid correspondent is going to be traveling to the heart of the financial turmoil, the eye of the storm, the Land of the PIGS.

Simon Johnson and Peter Boone claim - with a dramatic flair - that the impending euro crisis that originated in these European countries will lead us down the road to economic serfdom. Years of imprudent fiscal management has created a mountain of debt which, when combined with reckless short-term politicking by Europe's political elite, threatens to collapse the modern welfare system as we know it and send shock waves through the global economy.

I doubt it. But in order to find out more, I will be spending the next couple of weeks exploring a few of these countries, talking to locals about their views on sovereign debt, credit rating agencies, monetary policy, Bundestag politicians, and... oh hell, who am I kidding? I'm going to be sitting on a beach, sipping wine and looking for a Bernini sculpture that I can pick up on the cheap once the euro goes down the crapper.

See you in a few weeks.

Monday, 24 May 2010

It's Regulatory Culture, Stupid

There's a lot of interesting activity these days with respect to reforming financial regulation and oversight. On one side of the pond, the US Senate just approved a "far reaching" regulatory bill, which, if stitched together with the House of Reps version, could mean big changes are coming to Wall Street. Meanwhile, on the other side of the pond, the United Kingdom's new Coalition Government of Everlasting Friendship seems set to push forward with reform of its own.

Commentary abounds on both of these projects, but I would merely point to two articles: the first by Clive Crook on the US Senate bill; the second by Howard Davies and David Green (both formerly of the Financial Services Authority) on the situation in the UK.

To set the stage, Davies and Green make a truly important point:
"Any objective assessment of regulatory structures around the world during the crisis would find little or no relationship between structure and success."
This is exactly right. We'll come back to that in a second. They continue:
"But we can draw three lessons from the crisis. First, the central bank needs good information about the financial system as a whole. Second, there is an argument for a second tool for the central bank to influence credit conditions. And third, the case for integrated regulation has been strengthened."
The second tool being referred to is the anomalous "macroprudential regulation" - the idea being that measures which would fall under this category (raising capital requirements, modify mortgage requirements, whatever else) might have a similar impact on the supply of credit as would changing the interest rate. It therefore makes sense to have them considered together. Okay, I'm convinced.

But under what structure? Davies and Green think that both should be under the roof of the central bank. Another possibility is the one proposed in the US Senate finance bill: create a financial stability oversight council. The council would consist of the most senior representatives from a whole range of government departments and agencies, including Treasury, the Fed, FDIC, the SEC, the new consumer protection agency, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. In theory, interest rate decisions could be discussed alongside a whole range of financial policy considerations: fiscal policy, mortgage regulations, competition concerns, you name it. Get all the key players in the same room, the thinking goes, and problems can be identified and solved in a more coordinated manner.

Clive Crook dismisses this council idea as a weak solution. To be sure, it has not done anything to simplify the messy spiderweb that is financial regulation in the United States. On the other hand, a similar committee exists in Canada, a country widely praised of late for having weathered the financial storm quite nicely - maybe it could work in the US as well?

This is where we return to the opening statement from Davies and Green: there is no link between structure and success. Regulatory structure can be, at best, a facilitator; at worst, a barrier. I suspect that this council will only be as effective as its members allow it to be. An ineffective council would merely result in the status quo. Anything beyond the status quo is progress. Viewed that way, there is a lot of scope for this council to demonstrate its value in heading off future financial crises.

Nevertheless, I am increasingly of the view that who is sitting around the table matters more than the shape of the table*, so to speak. People matter. Regulatory culture matters. And that, unfortunately, is not something which can be legislated.


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*It could very well be that I'm being heavily influenced by the book I am currently reading, Liaquat Ahamed's excellent Lords of Finance, which tells the story of the world's four most influential central bankers in the run-up to the Great Depression.