Posting has been a bit thin of late - mostly due to work concerns. Don't expect that to change for the next two weeks, however, because the winter Olympics are completely dominating my life right now. I apologize for nothing.
For the skeptics among you, I point to FP passports photo essay of unlikely olympians, including athletes representing Ghana, Ethiopia, Iran, Jamaica and Cyprus.
Go World. More importantly: Go Canada.
Wednesday, 17 February 2010
Monday, 15 February 2010
Out of the History Books
I'm about a third of the way through Charles Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes - a historical examination of financial crises over the past few centuries. It's an interesting read, and Kindleberger regularly sprinkles in some real gems. For instance, in discussing some of the causes of over-zealous investment during a financial bubble, he opines that "There is nothing so disturbing to one's well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich." The same can be said of our financial institutions.
Here's another: "For historians, each event is unique. Economics, however, maintains that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. History is particular; economics is general."
Kindleberger tries to weave his way through the particulars to arrive at some general conclusions about crises, and it's sobering stuff. We're used to hearing about the Great Depression, but things pretty much drop off for anything prior. But let me tell you, there were crises galore in the 18th and 19th centuries. The worst part? Although the particulars differ, they tend to bear remarkable similarities to our latest meltdown.
In fact, many of the debates back then echo to the debates being waged today. Writing in the post-WWII period, Chicago economist Henry Simon was arguing that it was not the money supply, not government policy, but rather the instability of credit markets that created a fragile financial system: "He was concerned about the speculative temper of the community and the ease with which short-term nonbank borrowing and lending made society vulnerable to changes in business confidence." Again, the details have changed, but the collapse in confidence in uninsured non-bank lending was a major component of the credit crunch that fed our latest meltdown.
It's something to ponder as practitioners, regulators and policymakers pick up their socks and attempt to try again. How long before the lessons from mortgage-backed securities fade away and the unintended consequences of the latest policy decisions set the stage for the next crisis?
Here's another: "For historians, each event is unique. Economics, however, maintains that forces in society and nature behave in repetitive ways. History is particular; economics is general."
Kindleberger tries to weave his way through the particulars to arrive at some general conclusions about crises, and it's sobering stuff. We're used to hearing about the Great Depression, but things pretty much drop off for anything prior. But let me tell you, there were crises galore in the 18th and 19th centuries. The worst part? Although the particulars differ, they tend to bear remarkable similarities to our latest meltdown.
In fact, many of the debates back then echo to the debates being waged today. Writing in the post-WWII period, Chicago economist Henry Simon was arguing that it was not the money supply, not government policy, but rather the instability of credit markets that created a fragile financial system: "He was concerned about the speculative temper of the community and the ease with which short-term nonbank borrowing and lending made society vulnerable to changes in business confidence." Again, the details have changed, but the collapse in confidence in uninsured non-bank lending was a major component of the credit crunch that fed our latest meltdown.
It's something to ponder as practitioners, regulators and policymakers pick up their socks and attempt to try again. How long before the lessons from mortgage-backed securities fade away and the unintended consequences of the latest policy decisions set the stage for the next crisis?
Wednesday, 10 February 2010
Eurozone Crisis- Simon Johnson has you covered
I have been mulling a thorough post on the developing Eurozone sovereign debt crisis for the past two days, thinking of ways I could adequately present the necessary context, theoretical arguments and implications to the global economy. But in reading through Simon Johnson's coverage of the developments in Europe, I realized something: I can't possibly deliver a better analysis than he has. So instead of trying in vain to duplicate his efforts, I point you towards The Baseline Scenario:
-Johnson's first look at the situation asked whether US policymakers, specifically Tim Geithner, understood the risks posed by a European sovereign debt crisis to America and the global economy
-Over the weekend, Johnson looked at the likelihood of IMF involvement in Greece, the irrelevance of the G7 and the implications of European policymakers' dithering
-Today, Johnson, Peter Boone and James Kwak released their Revised Baseline Scenario for 2010, which includes a great treatment of the Eurozone's sovereign debt woes and its broader implications. This is a long post, but I recommend reading it in full for their 2010 outlook.
Markets rallied yesterday on signs the European big boys would step in and back Greece. ECB President Trichet rushed back from a trip abroad and there were rumors circulating that Germany, the only Eurozone country that really has the balance sheet and power to step in at this point, was constructing a 'firewall' of sorts that would stem any contagion from the Greek crisis. But Germany later denied any plans were in the works, which rattled investors again.
I suspect we'll get some official statements out of the ECB and Commission by the end of the day, hopefully laying out some concrete steps to resolve the situation. But if you believe Simon Johnson, it may all be too late.
-Johnson's first look at the situation asked whether US policymakers, specifically Tim Geithner, understood the risks posed by a European sovereign debt crisis to America and the global economy
-Over the weekend, Johnson looked at the likelihood of IMF involvement in Greece, the irrelevance of the G7 and the implications of European policymakers' dithering
-Today, Johnson, Peter Boone and James Kwak released their Revised Baseline Scenario for 2010, which includes a great treatment of the Eurozone's sovereign debt woes and its broader implications. This is a long post, but I recommend reading it in full for their 2010 outlook.
Markets rallied yesterday on signs the European big boys would step in and back Greece. ECB President Trichet rushed back from a trip abroad and there were rumors circulating that Germany, the only Eurozone country that really has the balance sheet and power to step in at this point, was constructing a 'firewall' of sorts that would stem any contagion from the Greek crisis. But Germany later denied any plans were in the works, which rattled investors again.
I suspect we'll get some official statements out of the ECB and Commission by the end of the day, hopefully laying out some concrete steps to resolve the situation. But if you believe Simon Johnson, it may all be too late.
Krugman on Spain
Paul Krugman deconstructs the Spanish case and shows why: a) it's different from Greece, and b) how it reflects the Eurozone's broader problems.
Tuesday, 9 February 2010
Tuesday Readables
- Facts and Myths about Greek's sovereign debt woes: this is one of the better pieces I've seen so far.
- Michael Arghyrou and John Tsoukalas argue for the creation of a "strong" and weak" euro, both managed by the European Central Bank, as a solution to the looming sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe. (possibly gated link, sorry)
- Spillover effects: as investors are betting against the Euro and possibly forcing EU governments to make some tough decisions (see below), they are simultaneously fleeing towards the safety of the US dollar. So long as the US can continue to borrow cheaply, they are less likely to be forced to make some tough decisions about their own problems.
- What if Google was a state-owned company in the Ukraine?
- Indulge yourself and set aside 12 minutes to watch this stunning video. On as big a screen as you can find. It's almost entirely computer generated (except the person, clouds and pigeons), and makes Avatar look like an etch-a-sketch drawing.
- Michael Arghyrou and John Tsoukalas argue for the creation of a "strong" and weak" euro, both managed by the European Central Bank, as a solution to the looming sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe. (possibly gated link, sorry)
- Spillover effects: as investors are betting against the Euro and possibly forcing EU governments to make some tough decisions (see below), they are simultaneously fleeing towards the safety of the US dollar. So long as the US can continue to borrow cheaply, they are less likely to be forced to make some tough decisions about their own problems.
- What if Google was a state-owned company in the Ukraine?
- Indulge yourself and set aside 12 minutes to watch this stunning video. On as big a screen as you can find. It's almost entirely computer generated (except the person, clouds and pigeons), and makes Avatar look like an etch-a-sketch drawing.
Monday, 8 February 2010
Eurozone Crisis: Sell, Sell, Sell
I apologize for the light posting of late. I've been preoccupied with some pretty heavy work-related stuff. But I want to devote much of this week to the developing eurozone crisis. A backgrounder will follow shortly, but to give you an idea of how serious the situation in Europe is, traders have taken over $8bn in short positions against the euro, the largest bet ever against the common currency.
That's massive, almost equal to the $10bn bet against sterling made by George Soros that 'broke' the bank of England in 1992 and ejected sterling from the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism.
The euro was supposed to be one of the big winners of the financial crisis; for the 'safety' it provided countries like Slovakia, for the credible external commitment its accession criteria provided countries like Hungary and Poland, and for its rise as a viable reserve alternative to the dollar. But all of the sudden the euro is confronted with its biggest crisis and I sense that policymakers will soon encounter a stark choice: explicitly back countries like Greece and Portugal or eject them from the common currency.
Stay tuned.
That's massive, almost equal to the $10bn bet against sterling made by George Soros that 'broke' the bank of England in 1992 and ejected sterling from the European Exchange-Rate Mechanism.
The euro was supposed to be one of the big winners of the financial crisis; for the 'safety' it provided countries like Slovakia, for the credible external commitment its accession criteria provided countries like Hungary and Poland, and for its rise as a viable reserve alternative to the dollar. But all of the sudden the euro is confronted with its biggest crisis and I sense that policymakers will soon encounter a stark choice: explicitly back countries like Greece and Portugal or eject them from the common currency.
Stay tuned.
Labels:
Currencies,
Euro,
Europe,
financial crisis,
sovereign debt
Thursday, 4 February 2010
Keynes vs. Hayek: Rap Duel
For a little while back in grad school, I was toying with the idea of writing my thesis as a sort of "Keynes vs. Hayek" debate, early 21st century edition. I eventually abondoned the idea as impractical, and thank goodness: I would never have been able to top this:
Thanks to Tony H for this awesomeness.
Thanks to Tony H for this awesomeness.
Tuesday, 2 February 2010
In the News: Canadian Banking Regulation
The Links
- For the second year running, the World Economic Forum has ranked the Canadian financial system as the soundest in the world. (It's a decidedly lower bar these days, no?)
- Paul Krugman tries to explain why this is the case in his weekend editorial, but in his effort to create a narrative he misses some important points.
- For a more comprehensive look at the issue, Chrystia Freeland does the job well.
Missing from all of these summaries, however, is one minor niggling point: had the US not bailed out some of its major financial institutions, the story in Canada could very well have been very different.
A few thoughts
The lesson of Canada is not one easily grafted on to major banking sectors like those in the US and UK. Underlying all of this prudent banking is a fundamental lack of competition, both domestic and foreign - something that simply would not fly in any city aspiring to be a global financial hub. To a certain extent, the ease with which Canadian financial institutions have access to American markets has given them space to take a more conservative approach. And while the lack of competition may be stable, it's not something the customers of Canadian banks are always the beneficiaries of, either.
I recently read a US Congressional research report attempting to draw lessons from the Canadians for American banking reform efforts. One of the most noticeable contrasts is between Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the report. Compared to the relatively simple and centralized regulatory structure in Canada, the flow chart of the US system is reminiscent of that ridiculous COIN graph. Nevertheless, the report concludes that, essentially, the Canadian system works pretty well in Canada but is heavily context-specific. There are good lessons to be learned, but they are not easily transferable elsewhere. Sorry.
- For the second year running, the World Economic Forum has ranked the Canadian financial system as the soundest in the world. (It's a decidedly lower bar these days, no?)
- Paul Krugman tries to explain why this is the case in his weekend editorial, but in his effort to create a narrative he misses some important points.
- For a more comprehensive look at the issue, Chrystia Freeland does the job well.
Missing from all of these summaries, however, is one minor niggling point: had the US not bailed out some of its major financial institutions, the story in Canada could very well have been very different.
A few thoughts
The lesson of Canada is not one easily grafted on to major banking sectors like those in the US and UK. Underlying all of this prudent banking is a fundamental lack of competition, both domestic and foreign - something that simply would not fly in any city aspiring to be a global financial hub. To a certain extent, the ease with which Canadian financial institutions have access to American markets has given them space to take a more conservative approach. And while the lack of competition may be stable, it's not something the customers of Canadian banks are always the beneficiaries of, either.
I recently read a US Congressional research report attempting to draw lessons from the Canadians for American banking reform efforts. One of the most noticeable contrasts is between Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the report. Compared to the relatively simple and centralized regulatory structure in Canada, the flow chart of the US system is reminiscent of that ridiculous COIN graph. Nevertheless, the report concludes that, essentially, the Canadian system works pretty well in Canada but is heavily context-specific. There are good lessons to be learned, but they are not easily transferable elsewhere. Sorry.
Friday, 29 January 2010
Friday fun: Bill Gates drinks Berlusconi's milkshake
Bill Gates announced today that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation will spend $10bn over 10 years on developing vaccines for the world's poorest countries. They aim to vaccinate over 90% of children in these countries, and could save over 8.7 million young lives as a result. Gates and his wife are arguably the greatest philanthropists of modern times, using their wealth and influence to address some of the world most under-resourced problems.
Gates also has a sharp sense of humor, as evidenced by the following shot he took at epic blowhard, sometimes assault victim and eternal IPE Journal whipping-boy Silvio Berlusconi:
'Rich people spend a lot more money on their own problems, like baldness, than they do to fight malaria...Dear Silvio, I am sorry to make things difficult for you, but you are ignoring the world's poor.'
In other words, 'I drink your milkshake.'
According to FP Passport, Italy's foreign aid budget was approximately 0.11% of GDP in 2009, one of the lowest in the developed world and half its 2008 amount. This contrasts starkly with the amount of money Berlusconi spends on his own image, which my conservative estimates put at 4,000% of his GBI (gross Berlusconi income).
The Italian premier has grabbed headlines in Italy this week for a disappearing, then reappearing, then disappearing head of hair. The bald Berlusconi is a known purveyor of the art of hair restoration, but the country is gripped by his latest, some might say insufficient, attempts at scalp renewal (I might exaggerate a tad, but it's my blog, so it must be true).
In contrast, Bill Gates spent a great deal of his time and money this week helping the world's poorest and most vulnerable.
Gates also has a sharp sense of humor, as evidenced by the following shot he took at epic blowhard, sometimes assault victim and eternal IPE Journal whipping-boy Silvio Berlusconi:
'Rich people spend a lot more money on their own problems, like baldness, than they do to fight malaria...Dear Silvio, I am sorry to make things difficult for you, but you are ignoring the world's poor.'
In other words, 'I drink your milkshake.'
According to FP Passport, Italy's foreign aid budget was approximately 0.11% of GDP in 2009, one of the lowest in the developed world and half its 2008 amount. This contrasts starkly with the amount of money Berlusconi spends on his own image, which my conservative estimates put at 4,000% of his GBI (gross Berlusconi income).
The Italian premier has grabbed headlines in Italy this week for a disappearing, then reappearing, then disappearing head of hair. The bald Berlusconi is a known purveyor of the art of hair restoration, but the country is gripped by his latest, some might say insufficient, attempts at scalp renewal (I might exaggerate a tad, but it's my blog, so it must be true).
In contrast, Bill Gates spent a great deal of his time and money this week helping the world's poorest and most vulnerable.
Quick hits and pink picks: US GDP Surges
After a busy busy week, I am happy to get back to the blog today and hit on a few points I missed while drowning in Excel hell...
-Hot off the presses: US GDP surged a whopping 5.7% in Q4 2009, the best quarter in over six years, and driven by companies ramping up production to overcome thin inventories amid rising consumer demand. Consumer spending, which accounts for over 2/3 of US economic activity, expanded by a better-than-expected 2%. I'm not even going to make a comment about a job-less recovery, as these are really strong numbers, unless I just did...
-Bernanke wins reappointment, which Simon Johnson believes is the beginning of the end for financial reform. While I disagree (though I imagine the difference in our expectations is only a matter of degree), Johnson's post is great on the strength of the following sentence:
And now we can look back over 20 years and be honest with ourselves: Alan Greenspan contends for the title of most disastrous economic policy maker in the recent history of the world
-The FT has you covered for all things Davos. It's been striking just how little coverage the World Economic Forum has received this year. I wonder if our appetite for it has diminished due to a credibility gap, or if there has been a conscious effort by the WEF to keep a low profile?
-Chavez orders the central bank to 'burn the hands' of currency 'speculators' by selling dollars to strengthen the Bolivar by some 30% in unregulated trading. Massive capital flight complicates his plans.
-FP Passport asks the question we've all been wondering: 'Did Romania's president use the occult to get reelected?"
-Greece is offering investors a large yield premium on its upcoming bond issue, an event deemed 'absolutely critical' to market sentiment and the government's efforts to reign in the budget.
-Are you an English hooligan? Planning on watching your boys lose to the mighty mighty US in person this World Cup (jk)? Denied!
-Hot off the presses: US GDP surged a whopping 5.7% in Q4 2009, the best quarter in over six years, and driven by companies ramping up production to overcome thin inventories amid rising consumer demand. Consumer spending, which accounts for over 2/3 of US economic activity, expanded by a better-than-expected 2%. I'm not even going to make a comment about a job-less recovery, as these are really strong numbers, unless I just did...
-Bernanke wins reappointment, which Simon Johnson believes is the beginning of the end for financial reform. While I disagree (though I imagine the difference in our expectations is only a matter of degree), Johnson's post is great on the strength of the following sentence:
And now we can look back over 20 years and be honest with ourselves: Alan Greenspan contends for the title of most disastrous economic policy maker in the recent history of the world
-The FT has you covered for all things Davos. It's been striking just how little coverage the World Economic Forum has received this year. I wonder if our appetite for it has diminished due to a credibility gap, or if there has been a conscious effort by the WEF to keep a low profile?
-Chavez orders the central bank to 'burn the hands' of currency 'speculators' by selling dollars to strengthen the Bolivar by some 30% in unregulated trading. Massive capital flight complicates his plans.
-FP Passport asks the question we've all been wondering: 'Did Romania's president use the occult to get reelected?"
-Greece is offering investors a large yield premium on its upcoming bond issue, an event deemed 'absolutely critical' to market sentiment and the government's efforts to reign in the budget.
-Are you an English hooligan? Planning on watching your boys lose to the mighty mighty US in person this World Cup (jk)? Denied!
Labels:
central banking,
Currencies,
football,
greece,
sovereign debt
Thursday, 28 January 2010
Too Big To FAIL
In the past week there has been plenty of analysis on the Volcker Rule - largely by people more knowledgeable than myself. Most, it appears, agree with the notion that we need to do something to prevent the capitalist pirates on-board S.S. Too Big To Fail (pictured right) from sailing around and holding the rest of our economic flotilla hostage. Most also seem to agree that this proposed "something" is better than nothing.
Much of this is speculation, however, since we lack the necessary details to make a final judgment - details which will apparently be left to that venerable institution known as the US Congress. If the healthcare bill is anything to go by.... nevermind.
But let's back up a bit. Because while I have made it clear that Volcker's vision sounds - at first glance - to be quite compelling, I am still struggling with some of the key concepts. Well, one key concept actually: too big to fail. Volcker's plans rest on the notion that commercial banking has a privileged place in our financial system. We depend upon our banks for the day-to-day running of the economy, the argument goes, so we cannot allow them to act like hedge funds on the side. Fair enough.
But merely separating the two activities into "can be allowed to fail" and "can't be allowed to fail" doesn't really address the problem. Much of the financial turmoil originated in the shadow banking sector: entities engaged in "bank-like" activities (originating loans, re-packaging and securitizing debt) that did not have the level of regulation that commercial banks do OR any of the deposit insurance that keeps things secure (detailed explanation available here). When things went tits up, investors fled the shadow banking sector for, you guessed it, the heavily insured mainstream banking sector. Presto, credit crunch.
So again, the question comes down to how splitting apart the riskiest behaviour of our banks is going to prevent a future crisis of this nature. Poor banking regulation was certainly a problem, but so was the fact that a huge financial industry was created outside the regulatory system. It had no safety valve, no backup whatsoever. Volcker's plan does not appear to address this. If anything, it might make this line of business more profitable.
How can we be so sure that only deposit-taking institutions are systemically important (re: too-big-to-fail) enough to protect? The answer is that we can't. Maybe I've been listening to the top financial regulator in my country too much, but it seems the very act of identifying too-big-to-fail creates its own problems.
So I guess my concern with the Volcker Rule is not what it is proposing for deposit-taking institutions, but what it is not proposing for everyone else.
(Update: the top central bankers in both the UK and EU have vocalized their (qualified) support for the reform proposals - good to see the old boys network holding firm, eh whot?)
Wednesday, 27 January 2010
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