Monday, 25 January 2010

I'm now HUGE in Lagos

The venerable BBC World Service has a daily show called 'World Have Your Say,' where listeners and panelists from around the world call in to discuss a topical issue in global affairs. It streams live at 1800 GMT daily on the BBC World Service (here), and has its own blog where you can also post comments live on the air (here). You can also download each episode on iTunes (presumably the next day). Though I suspect it might be harder in China...

Today's topic was 'Google, China and the nature of free information.' I called in, as I have occasionally done in the past, and for the first time: I made it on air!

This was exciting. My two points were classic IPE, even if they were delivered in a very nervous and slightly convoluted manner: 1) what appears to be a commercial dispute is part of a broader escalation in tensions between China and the West, as the West realizes that its 30-year assumption that China's economic integration would be followed by political convergence with Western and democratic values is false, and 2) China risks setting a dangerous precedent that undermines the foreign investment critical to their economic development and ascent up the value-added chain.

If you ever wanted to put a voice to the words on these fine pages, you now can. Check it out!

UPDATE: Here's the podcast, I'm at the 24th minute mark.

Sunday, 24 January 2010

Weekend Remainders

A few links for your Sunday reading pleasure:

-As I mentioned on Sunday, China is suddenly likely to allow the renminbi to appreciate in 2010, breaking its de facto peg to the dollar. The FT analyzes.

-Dave asked a good question on the comments page of my Bernanke post below: what's up with Tim Geithner? Volcker apparently drank his milkshake in the White House banks debate, and then Geithner goes on television essentially undermining his president's proposals. Paul Krugman isn't happy about that.

-Looks like Bernanke might have the votes for confirmation after all. Simon Johnson started an interesting, short-lived movement to draft Paul Krugman for the job, but this was quickly snuffed out by Krugman himself.

-The Haitian government believes the earthquake will cut GDP by a whopping 25%.

-Seed Magazine looks at science as diplomacy.

-Obama's first year in statistics.

-Futurists in Britain predict new legs for all, especially troops and football stars.

-NYC's own Vampire Weekend debuted at #1 on the US Billboard charts with their new album 'Contra.' They played New York's Bowery Ballroom on Tuesday, a hometown celebration of sorts, and I was there. Fun was had by all.

Friday, 22 January 2010

Friday Fun: Creationism

There has been an awful lot of heavy IPE material to work through on the blog this week - we're clearly in need of a break. A guilty pleasure to ease the mind, perhaps. Now let me think: what would be an easy target to poke fun of.... ah yes: creationism.

I'll turn things over to A. A. Gill, via the February edition of Vanity Fair. Gill visits the creationist museum in Kentucky and proceeds to dismantle it in short, choppy sentences. A sample:
What is truly awe-inspiring about the museum is the task it sets itself: to rationalize a story, written 3,000 years ago, without allowing for any metaphoric or symbolic wiggle room. There’s no poetic license. This is a no-parable zone. It starts with the definitive answer, and all the questions have to be made to fit under it. That’s tough. Science has it a whole lot easier: It can change things. It can expand and hypothesize and tinker. Scientists have all this cool equipment and stuff. They’ve got all these “lenses” and things. They can see shit that’s invisible. And they stayed on at school past 14.
A nuanced discussion, this ain't. Enjoy!

Missing: Willem Buiter

One voice is notably absent, to me at least, from the debate over the Obama banking sector reforms: Willem Buiter's. If ever there was a moment for Buiter's unrivaled insight, especially on two topics he wrote so passionately about- bloated banks and central banking, it is now.

For those unfamiliar with Buiter, he's not dead. Rather, he assumed the Chief Economist position at Citigroup this month (he also remains at a little school Dave and I know something about), a move that forced him to end his influential blog at the FT called Maverecon. While he assured his readers that he would continue to speak out on the important issues of the day, he recognized his new position would in truth limit his ability to do so. Buiter once called his new employer 'a conglomeration of worst-practice from across the financial spectrum,' and I'm sure he sees his current role as a step towards fixing that. So it is not surprising that he is silent on an issue that affects the very foundation of the firm he now serves.

But it's a real shame.

Bye-Bye Bernanke?

The fate of Ben Bernanke's confirmation is getting a lot of play in the US media today. Momentum for his reappointment has slowed considerably over the past few weeks, and he is losing Democratic votes by the day. The Democratic leadership is reportedly 'scrambling' to shore up Bernanke's support, but it's possible that Ben's candidacy is dead in the water. That is remarkable to me.

President Obama's new banking proposals have opened another front in the Bernanke battle, and many, like Simon Johnson, are appropriately calling on Ben to clarify his position on these reforms. There is a growing lack of confidence in Bernanke's conviction to take the fight to the banks, and without picking up that mantle in a public and convincing manner, Bernanke might be done at the Fed.

Stay tuned, this is snowballing fast.

Some initial thoughts on the Obama's banking sector reforms

As Dave covered yesterday, Paul Volcker finally emerged from his (large) broom closet in the White House as the major force behind Obama's new banking sector reforms. To recap, the US president proposed two new reforms to end 'too big to fail' and limit the proprietary trading operations of banks. His proposals will: 1) prohibit banks from owning, sponsoring or investing hedge funds, private equity funds or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to servicing their customers- the so-called 'Volcker Rule;' and 2) prevent the further consolidation of the financial industry.

On the surface these reforms mark a dramatic departure from the administration's standing approach to financial sector reform (fairly benign). But before we get ahead of ourselves with excitement, it is important to recognize the considerable obstacles to these proposals ever becoming law, and examine whether what sounds good in theory is actually inadequate in practice. A few thoughts:

-Obviously we are a bit light on the very critical details. For instance, how exactly will the administration prevent further consolidation in the industry, or end 'too big to fail' as we know it? By limiting the size of individual firms through a cap on assets under management or deposits? Or by applying robust anti-trust scrutiny to any future mergers and acquisitions of financial firms? It seems the administration has collapsed two very different and tricky issues into one concept: limiting systemic risk. You can cap a bank's size, and therefore risk to the system, through higher capital adequacy requirements, but this doesn't address the off-balance sheet activities that were the real systemic threat during the crisis. You might reply that the Volcker Rule would largely resolve the off-balance sheet problem, but it seems the administration has very consciously linked the prohibition on these activities to the prevailing bank-holding company model. Remember, all the big investment banks converted into bank-holding companies during the crisis to access Fed funding, which then entailed setting up retail banking, or deposit-taking, operations. Under the Volcker Rule, these banks would now be unable to de-link retail and trading operations, even conceptually, thus prohibiting every major bank from engaging in proprietary trading unrelated to traditional brokerage (think boring mutual funds instead of exotic securities). There goes almost ALL the profit-making activities the banks currently have.

But what if banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley simply converted into a different legal entity once they no longer relied on easy Fed funding for their trading operations? By ditching the small retail operations they have built, they could theoretically return to the old model once they are self-sustainable, thereby bypassing the Volcker Rule all together. This would put banks with huge depository operations like JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America at a competitive disadvantage. Everyone joked before the crisis that Goldman Sachs was the biggest hedge fund in the world: what prevents them from becoming something like an alternative asset management firm? It's customers would in theory possess a higher risk-tolerance and proprietary trading operations could be justified on serving this investor profile. Without formally resurrecting Glass-Steagall, which doesn't appear to be on the table, I am unclear how the administration can put in place a regulatory apparatus that stays two-steps ahead of financial and legal innovation.

-These reforms are an important step in the right direction, but they are also blatantly political, which makes them vulnerable on a number of levels. The administration is claiming that the proposals have been under serious discussion for months, they just needed to be refined and introduced at the appropriate time. This is plausible, as they were proposed on the very day that health care reform 'died.' The administration may have simply been planning a big financial reform push following health care's conclusion, which they expected this month. And surely the posture of bank execs before Congress last week, not to mention record bonus announcements, didn't do themselves or their industry any favors. 'Keep it cool' Obama seems genuinely furious.

But its timing on the heels of the Massachusetts primary in which a Republican candidate won the seat held by Ted Kennedy for four decades smacks of calculated populism. The FT said as much in its editorial. This leaves it subject to political horse-trading, both within Congress and between legislators and the administration. Could it become a bargaining chip in preserving the controversial consumer financial protection agency, Obama's centerpiece reform? Obama could pick off a few Republican supporters for the banking proposals; John McCain has expressed some similar sentiments recently, and the issue taps right into the anti-Wall Street fervor that shows no signs of abating. But he could also lose votes on his side, like Joe Lieberman or the chairman-in-waiting of the Senate Banking Committee Tim Johnson, who is a 'friend' of the financial services industry, to put it diplomatically. If financial reform gets held up until after the mid-terms (when Chris Dodd, current chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, retires) a Johnson chairmanship could pose real problems for the administration.

-Finally, let's say that the reforms get enacted in some form or another. The big winners are then the hedge fund and private equity industries. A lot of people predicted that they would increasingly fill the risk-taking space vacated by the big banks. But with Goldman trading the daylights out of essentially free loans from the Fed, the current status-quo retains plenty of risk-taking in the big institutions. But if prop desks are truly scaled down at these firms, suddenly hedge funds become the major traders in a range of instruments and markets, providing a goldmine to the industry. This raises a whole host of unresolved problems, including systemic risk considerations (remember Long Term Capital Management?). Reform of the hedge fund industry has proven surprisingly difficult in Europe, and limited reforms have thus far been proposed in the US.

So in conclusion, I am left with two basic questions: will the reforms be precise enough to achieve their objectives in an innovative marketplace, and what are the most effective tools in limiting the systemic risk posed by individual firms? I'm eager to see the details of the proposals.

Thursday, 21 January 2010

A defining moment for Ukraine, and a lesson in IPE

Ukraine is awaiting a run-off in its presidential election to be held on February 7th between leader of the opposition Viktor Yanukovych and current Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The winner will succeed President Viktor Yuschenko, who is leaving office with an approval rating in the low single digits, a dramatic fall from grace for the leader of the Orange Revolution. His successor will inherit a country in crisis: economically, financially and existentially. This election could not be more important for Ukraine's future.

Yuschenko's presidency was an utter failure. Granted, he had little domestic support, as his current prime minister (Tymoshenko) is also his fiercest political rival. But his economic record has been dismal in response to the Ukraine's crisis, sacrificing his early achievements in attracting FDI and cutting unemployment. While he has succeeded in turning Ukraine away from Russia and set the country on a path towards European integration (WTO accession, a promise of future NATO membership and negotiations over an FTA with Brussels), he has also presided over near-annual gas wars with Russia that threaten Europe's supplies, a total economic deterioration (GDP contracted about 15% in 2009) and non-observance of key conditions to Ukraine's $16.4 billion IMF program. This led the IMF to suspend its fourth disbursement or $3.8 billion, leaving Ukraine on the brink of default. Yuschenko also managed to swing public opinion decisively against NATO and EU accession, undermining his key foreign policy successes.

Conventional wisdom therefore interprets the current election as a repudiation of Yuschenko's pro-Western agenda, with the two leading candidates representing a more Russia-oriented foreign policy in the years ahead. But according to Samuel Charap's recent article in Foreign Policy, this assumption overstates the degree to which either Yanukovych or Tymoshenko will turn to Russia. Neither candidate is a 'pro-Russian stooge,' even Yanukovych, who according to Charap did little to endear himself to the Kremlin during his stint as prime minister, even if he was the Kremlin's 'preferred' candidate the last time around. Further, the interests that back Yanukovych are heavily invested in EU trade, so one can expect a lot of pressure on the potential president to deepen Ukraine's economic integration into Europe. This is far more critical to Ukraine's future than the immediate prospects for NATO accession.

Tymoshenko's presidency would hold the most promise, as she is likely to fashion a commanding political majority that would leave her free to enact key economic policy reforms, most importantly the 2010 budget and energy sector reform, that would unlock the remaining IMF funds and set Ukraine on a path to recovery. She would also prioritize Ukraine's relationship with Russia, but in the interest of rapprochement, which is as important to Europe (see: gas) as it is to Russia. Thus, both candidates are likely to conduct a more balanced foreign policy, which would be in the interest of all parties. But economics will determine Ukraine's future, and neither candidate can afford to ignore the pressing challenges at home. Both the EU and Russia have a role to play in stabilizing Ukraine's economy.

One of the fundamental insights of IPE is that domestic politics matter as much in the international arena as they do internally. They either enable or constrain foreign policy decisions, and Ukraine's current situation highlights this perfectly. The EU/Russia dichotomy that Yuschenko spent so much time constructing has clouded our perspective on the current candidates and their impact on Ukraine's future, as Charap's article illustrates. Their presidencies will be dominated by jobs, energy and trade. Rapprochement with Russia is likely and welcome, but there are powerful interest groups in favor of further economic integration with the EU. This will check any drift eastward.

"Wake up Gentlemen:" Paul Volcker has landed

Expect some big financial news out of Washington today: it looks like President Obama is set to publicly support the "Volcker banking plan." Paul Volcker has been pushing this approach for some time (Mervyn King has been doing something similar in the UK), but this is the first time he appears to be getting public support from his boss. Broadly speaking, Volcker's goal is to split the potentially contradictory activities of major banks:
"On the one hand, they are commercial banks, taking deposits, making standard loans and managing the nation’s payment system. On the other hand, they trade securities for their own accounts, a hugely profitable endeavor. This proprietary trading, mainly in risky mortgage-backed securities, precipitated the credit crisis in 2008 and the federal bailout..... Under the new approach, commercial banks would no longer be allowed to engage in proprietary trading, using customers’ deposits and borrowed money to carry out these trades."
Simon Johnson provides some cheerleading; Tyler Cowen provides a list of questions to ask yourself when the new plan emerges. Should be fun.

UPDATE: oh my goodness, oh my goodness, oh my goodness! Press release is here.

Wednesday, 20 January 2010

Wednesday Readables

- John Kay creates analogy between investors and tailgators; proceeds to beat metaphor to death.

- The New York Times to imitate the Financial Times' gated system; Felix Salmon analyzes

- Zimbabwe becomes more mobile, faces dollarization difficulties and even, um, deflation

- Why cable television is bundled. (But just because consumers prefer flat rates, it doesn't necessarily make them a good idea for most people - ditto with gym memberships).

- "If you find yourself in a suddenly resource-rich emerging market and you're interested in knowing whether revenues are being put to the proper uses, just go find the houses of the local government leaders."

- More evidence that Britain is drinking more, binging more, and being less social about it (as if we needed any)

Tuesday, 19 January 2010

Cheap Money and the Carry Trade, part I: Blowing Bubbles

There are probably very few activities which are shared by both schoolchildren and our fiscal & monetary policymakers, but blowing bubbles is one of them. The difference being that the kids' bubbles usually consist of soap, are far more entertaining, and cannot cause ruin to entire economies when they pop. But it's the metaphorical asset bubbles that I am more interested in.

Metaphorical bubbles and their non-metaphorical problems
Which brings us to the lead story in last week's The Economist. The editorial worries that the loose monetary policies adopted by major economies (printing money; very low interest rates) has created an environment vulnerable to further asset bubbles. In the short term, the side-effect of cheap money on asset prices is being welcomed by many: the profits are helping the market rebound from its earlier downward spiral and firms' balance sheets are being strengthened as a result.

But there are longer-run issues to be concerned about. As the articles explains, "The problem for [investors] is not just that valuations look high by historic standards. It is also that the current combination of high asset prices, low interest rates and massive fiscal deficits is unsustainable." Eventually the cheap money is going to run out when governments scale back their extraordinary measures - this is not a secret. What is not known, however, is whether the process of scaling back is going to be smooth or volatile. History suggests that we cannot assume a smooth transition.

Carry Trade 2009-?
Not all the evidence points to asset bubbles - see The Economist's other article - at least not for the wealthiest economies. Emerging markets, however, are the destination of a lot of this cheap money, which creates its own challenges. To understand why this is so, let's look back to Nouriel Roubini's November editorial about the Mother of All Carry Trades that began in 2009. The "carry trade" is the practice of borrowing in a cheap currency (the USD, with a near-zero - and sometimes negative - interest rate) and investing in risky assets with higher return. Here's Roubini:

"Let's sum up: traders are borrowing at negative 20 per cent rates to invest on a highly leveraged basis on a mass of risky global assets that are rising in price due to excess liquidity and a massive carry trade. Every investor who plays this risky game looks like a genius – even if they are just riding a huge bubble financed by a large negative cost of borrowing – as the total returns have been in the 50-70 per cent range since March [2009]....
Yet, at the same time, the perceived riskiness of individual asset classes is declining as volatility is diminished due to the Fed’s policy of buying everything in sight... By effectively reducing the volatility of individual asset classes, making them behave the same way, there is now little diversification across markets.

Does that bolded sentence sound familiar? It should if you've been following the financial crisis at all. The perception of decreasing risk due to lower volatility can be misleading.

Bear in mind that this carry trade is contingent on cheap borrowing. When (not if) borrowing in USD becomes more expensive, this effect will have to reverse itself or shift to a new currency, like the Yen. If this happens suddenly, Roubini believes there will be a stampede "as closing long leveraged risky asset positions across all asset classes funded by dollar shorts triggers a co-ordinated collapse of all those risky assets – equities, commodities, emerging market asset classes and credit instruments."

So maybe this bubble will pop, as Roubini argues it will. Maybe it will simply deflate. The fact is that nobody can say for certain - but the risk is there. Remember the story of Icelandic people blowing up their Land Rovers to avoid paying them off after the krona tanked? That's a dramatic but useful illustration of what happens when the carry trade reverses itself rapidly.

In the meantime, as I alluded to above, the consequences of cheap money flowing to emerging markets are being felt in a number of areas. I'll look at some of the implications in the next installment.

Monday, 18 January 2010

Venezuela Update: The Hugo Chavez Show continues

Acting on his threats from last week, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has begun nationalizing retail stores that would not agree to his enforced "everything 50% off sale:"

President Hugo Chavez ordered Sunday the seizure of a French-owned retail chain on accusations that it raised prices after Venezuela devalued the currency by half....
Almacenes Exito saw some of its stores closed this week by government authorities on accusations that it was increasing prices regardless of Mr. Chavez's orders that retailers were not to adjust prices after he devalued the currency to 4.3 bolivars per dollar from the previous rate of 2.15 bolivars....
Separately, Mr. Chavez also ordered the nationalization of a large shopping-mall recently built in a downtown district in Caracas. The stores controlled by Exito and the shopping mall will be used to build up Comerso, a new government-run retail chain which seeks to sell its products at "socialist" prices, according to the president.

Today it's retail outlets, tomorrow it will be the poisonous video game industry. One can only hope that Chavez will be modeling the new line of government-approved socialist garments on his weekly TV-radio program.

Sunday, 17 January 2010

Quick hits and pink picks: emerging markets edition

The FT's profile this weekend of Jim O'Neill, the Goldman Sachs economist who coined the now ubiquitous acronym 'BRICS,' got me thinking about one of my main objectives for IPE Journal: a dedicated focus on the 'rise of the rest.' In looking back over the history of my posts, I realized that the financial crisis, perhaps inevitably, distracted me from this emphasis as my coverage became far more US-centric than I anticipated or desired. That is partly a reflection of the US' role in the crisis and the overwhelming media coverage of the US financial sector over the past year, partly my own engrained anglo-saxon bias in choice of literature and media outlets, and partly a recognition that the majority of our readers are in fact based in North America.

But the pace with which countries like China, Brazil and Indonesia have emerged from the Great Recession has crystalized the importance of the emerging economies to not just my own worldview, but I suspect those of our readers as well. So the following links represent a shift back to the emerging markets and issues that are likely to play a defining role in the years ahead. That is not to say my coverage of US banks or Gordon Brown will cease entirely, but expect a much smaller role for Lord Mandy in the months ahead. This is, after all, a blog on International Political Economy. But I do love Mandelson.

-Via Free Exchange, The Economist looks at a McKinsey study on deleveraging that partly demonstrates why the big emerging markets have emerged far quicker from the crisis than the major economies (Russia aside). If you follow the links to the actual article, I found it interesting that when viewed through the prism of crises, countries like the US and Spain currently look a lot like emerging markets have historically in the aftermath of such episodes.

-China finally takes its foot off the gas by raising reserve requirements on lenders and reimposing a sales tax on certain home sales, fearing that the economy is overheating (asset bubbles and inflation). Conventional wisdom six months ago held that China was likely to allow a gradual depreciation of the renminbi to export its way out of the economic slowdown. Six months later, is a gradual appreciation more likely in 2010?

-A constitutional crisis looms in Nigeria, threatening a recovery in oil output and social/political stability.

-Chile continues the resurgence of the right in the Americas. With Venezuela plunging quite literally into darkness and (hyper)inflation, the 'Bolivarian Revolution' that swept the region looks less-than-promising ten years on.

-Finally, and contrary to the first link, the future may be bright for the emerging economies, but are investors touched by a bit of irrational enthusiasm at the moment?