Thursday, 9 December 2010

"What is this Land Rover of which you speak?"

In his April 2009 article for Vanity Fair (no longer fully available), Michael Lewis told the story about how Iceland's banking system basically imploded during the financial crisis. One of my favourite stories from the article is the one he tells about the fate of the country's many Land Rovers.

Presumably because they are a great tool for hauling fish across the Icelandic tundra, Land Rovers were a popular item for the small island nation. They were even more popular as the result of the availability of cheap financing during the pre-crisis boom in credit. The problem was, this cheap financing was provided in foreign currency; the interest rate for euros, pounds and dollars was far lower than that for the domestic currency, the krona. This is all fine and good if your salary is paid in euros, pounds and dollars, but in fact most people in Iceland are paid in krona. 

When Iceland's economy went down the crapper, the value of the krona went with it. Since the value of their income had just plunged relative to the value of their debts, many civilized citizens of Iceland were forced to make one of two choices:
  1. Attempt to pay back their car loans in salted cod
  2. Do something crazy
Many chose the latter. There follows a brief representation of what I assume was a typical telephone call between an Icelandic bank and its client on the subject of overdue car payments in 2008:


"Icelandic Bank: Dear Mr. Ragnar Hjalrnarsson, the monthly payments on your Land Rover are 3 months overdue."


Mr. Hjalrnarsson: *panting furiously, having just run for cover*


"Iclelandic Bank: Mr. Hjalrnarsson?"


*KABOOOM*


"Mr. Hjalrnarsson: Land Rover? What is this Land Rover of which you speak?"
FIN

The fine folks in Iceland had resorted to blowing up their Land Rovers to avoid paying them back. Seriously. This is a country that, in 2008, still had a GDP-per-capita of over $52,000.

Why am I re-telling this story? Because the exploding Land Rover is a great metaphor for a currency mismatch: the situation wherein debts are denominated in a different currency than the income used to pay down those debts. Currency mismatches can exist not just for individuals, but for entire economies at the macro level. But since economies can't go around blowing up Land Rovers whenever it comes time to rollover their debts, the consequences can be quite severe. 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The most recent example of this phenomenon was in parts of Eastern Europe, particularly the Baltic states, way back in 2007-8. Countries like Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, etc... had a large number of loans outstanding to European banks (i.e. denominated in euros). Many of these debts were also short-term and needed to be rolled over right smack in the middle of the financial crisis (see a more detailed explanation in this old post). That proved problematic, to say the least. As a result, parts of Eastern and Southeastern Europe were among the hardest hit economies in an economic crisis that originated somewhere else.

The currency mismatch is not a problem specific to our most recent financial crisis, however; here is economist Morris Goldstein, speaking in 2007: 
".... [S]erious currency mismatch has been a feature of every major emerging-market currency crisis of the past dozen years. It was there in Mexico in 1994–95, in the Asian crisis countries in 1997–98, in Russia in 1998, in Brazil in 1998–99 and 2001–02, in Turkey in 2001–02, and in Argentina in 2001–02.... [C]urrency mismatch provides the best explanation we have for why large exchange rate depreciations in emerging economies have had such costly growth effects. When financial liabilities are mostly denominated in dollars or in other reserve currencies while assets and revenues are mainly denominated in local currency, then a large depreciation of the local currency will result in balance sheet problems that ultimately cause economic growth to nosedive."

Here is Brad DeLong:
"The decade of the 1990s was marked by the sudden emergence of international financial crises. In a typical such crisis, a sudden loss of confidence in the value of a country’s currency by international currency speculators was followed by a rapid rise in the value of foreign currency—in the exchange rate—the threat of large-scale bankruptcies of banks and firms, financial panic, and a sharp severe recession. These crises hit in the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-1995. Then followed the far-reaching East Asian crisis of 1997-1998. The decade ended with crises in Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina."

The currency mismatch is not merely a modern creature - oh no. In the period of unfettered capitalism that characterized the late 19th and early 20th centuries, "hot money" was flowing into what we would now call emerging markets: Southeast Asia and South America. There were quite a few financial blow-ups involving currency and maturity mismatches - the Barings crisis of 1890 being the most famous.

In other words, we need to recognize that the risk of a currency mismatch contributing a major financial meltdown is present in just about every period in which we see capital flowing easily across borders. This leads me to ask one simple, juvenile, question:

Why why why why WHY?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

With all this history, why hasn't anyone learned their bloody lesson? Why do we continue to see, to this very day, the potential for instability caused by currency mismatches present - and growing - in a variety of markets. I can think of several factors that play a role:

 1) Access - pretty straightforward: you need easy access to international capital markets. This has been easier during certain periods of time (pre-1914, the Great Moderation of the 1990s-2000s, etc) and in certain regions (for instance, small EU members have direct access to foreign lending from other EU members due to the membership requirement for open capital accounts).

2) Import requirements - it is unlikely that many exporters or banks will accept the Papua New Guinea kina in an exchange for the sale of goods & services, for instance. Small economies with non-reserve currencies need to use foreign currencies to purchase the things they need, or borrow the funds they need. This can lead to debts in those same foreign currencies.

3) Lack of trust in the local currency - often domestic borrowers will seek outside financing if the local currency has a history of high inflation, political meddling, or exchange rate volatility.

4) weak domestic capital markets - sometimes domestic borrowers simply cannot raise money domestically. There are any number of elements to this, including: restrictive local banking regulations, lack of expertise, or lack of appetite (see #3).

5) Behavioural/psychological element - it is hard to resist cheap money. Look at the subprime real estate crisis in the United States and you can see how difficult it is for people to resist borrowing irresponsibly (often from irresponsible lenders). The people in Iceland basically did the same thing, and got burned when interest rate on the loans shot up. People tend to overestimate their ability to predict future events. 


6) ...what have I missed?

One argument I'm not buying is lack of awareness. As illustrated above, the challenge of currency and maturity mismatches is not new. Policymakers know and appreciate the dangers associated with a country (or many of its citizens) borrowing in foreign currency, particularly for the short-term. But sometimes the problem is an inability to stop hot money inflows & outflows - see the point about access above - and the costs associated with markets who are perceived to have overly-restrictive measures in place for investments.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Why am I bothering with all of this? It is because, even though the crises I've mentioned above are mostly old news, the challenge posed by hot money inflows is as topical as ever. This is part due to the expansionary monetary policies adopted by the United States and other large developed economies to stimulate recovery. I discussed this back in April with this atrociously-titled post, but if anything the trend has become more pronounced in the period since then.

The recent IMF global markets monitor suggests that capital inflows to emerging markets continues to surge, led primarily by portfolio flows to liquid debt and equity markets. In many parts of the world (including parts of Latin America and Asia), the levels of inflows are reaching pre-Lehman levels. It is important to emphasize that this is not foreign direct investment (i.e. the money isn't there for the long-haul).

India is seeing heavy capital market inflows, again mostly in equities and mostly portfolio inflows. China is also trying to keep a lid on domestic credit growth and just recently capped the amount of lending by domestic banks.

In fact, many emerging markets are toying with capital controls as a way to limit volatility. Brazil has done so, and there is speculation (so far un-founded) that Malaysia will follow suit. Brazil was even somewhat successful in getting pro-capital control language in the G20 communique from Korea ("practical tools to overcome sudden reversals of flows," anyone?). The large exporters will also continue to keep large foreign exchange reserves as a buffer - a policy that turned out to be rather justified in recent years, despite the distorting effects it has on global imbalances and the huge opportunity cost.

All of this suggests that the dangers associated with currency mismatches and rapid capital inflows have not gone away. Quite the opposite. Large inflows may be justified in the current environment of strong emerging market performance, but our ability peer into the future is limited. We do not know what is coming next.

We do not know who will be blowing up their Land Rovers next.

Friday, 26 November 2010

Discouraging Thought of the Day: Perception vs. Activism

David Brooks, writing in the NYT on the centennial of Leo Tolstoy's death:

"As a novelist, Tolstoy was an unsurpassed observer. But he found that life unfulfilling. As he set out to improve the world, his ability to perceive it deteriorated. Instead of conforming his ideas to the particularities of existence, he conformed his perception of reality to his vision for the world. He preached universal love but seemed oblivious to the violence he was doing to his family."

Well. THAT's discouragingly accurate.

You can have clarity of observation, or you can set out to change the world, but not both simultaneously. It's the quantum physics of social activism.

Of course this applies not only to activists but do-ers of all kinds. As Cohen rightly suggests, the memoirs of political leaders tend to be skewed not (simply) because of attempts at whitewash, "but because they’ve been engaged in an activity that makes it impossible for them to see it clearly. Activism is admirable, necessary and self-undermining." Go watch The Fog of War if you doubt this.

This is also what occasionally makes business leaders very poor judges of economic policy (see here, for example).

But this is very bad news indeed for newly-minted grad students who are setting out to change the world.

Hmmm...

Best to start a blog instead.

Wednesday, 17 November 2010

Readables

- About a week old, but this is one of the best pieces I've read in a while. Follow-up is here.

- The, um, wanker-bankers have conned the Biffo Bunch

- Quantitative easing, explained. The Ben Bernank does not come off well

- Here is a better explanation of QEII. Here is another

- In related news, core inflation falls to record low.

Tuesday, 9 November 2010

Yeah, What Brad DeLong Said

In case you missed it, Bob Zoellick, the head of the World Bank, was pontificating in the FT this week about the merits of returning to some sort of gold peg for currencies. DeLong, in his typically understated fashion, shoots him down hard.

Without passing any particular judgement on Zoellick's mental faculties, I think it's fair to say that suggesting a return to the gold standard in any format is a bad idea no matter who is suggesting it. But like some form macroeconomic acne, the idea of the gold standard keeps popping back up in periods of stress. For example, see my comments on Gillian Tett's misguided op-ed in the FT last year.

At the time I argued that, using the same logic, an economy run by squirrels would use an acorn standard. Why? Because they like nuts, silly. This analogy is even more apt that I had initially realized: much like humans and gold, squirrels spend a lot of time and energy scurrying around gathering up acorns - only to promptly bury them back underground.

Where the analogy breaks down is that acorns actually have an intrinsic value (nutrition), whereas gold does not have much intrinsic value at all. Its skyrocketing price is the result of investors (and here I'm quoting DeLong again) "using gold as a speculative asset and a hedge. They are not using it [as] a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a safe store of nominal value."

As if this weren't damning enough, a return to a gold peg wouldn't even address the global imbalances problem. It would merely shift it around: US and European central banks own some 50% of the world's gold reserves. Hmmmmm. One suspects that if Saudi Arabia was the dominant world economy, we might be hearing ideas about an oil standard. This at least would have the added benefit of being a highly liquid asset. (HA!)

Seriously folks: this is gauling. All the more so because the gold standard is one of those rare phenomena in economics where it's not a theoretical debate. We've tested it out. It doesn't bloody work.

With so many potentially bad ideas floating around about how to fix the world economy, there's absolutely no reason why we need keep discussing the one we know for sure will be a disaster. 

UPDATE: Zoellick clarifies his comments: "Gold is now being viewed as an alternative monetary asset. This is not the same as a gold standard,” said Mr Zoellick. “Gold has become a reference point because holders of money see weak or uncertain growth prospects in all currencies other than the renminbi, and the renminbi is not free for exchange. So, in relative terms, gold is appealing to people who ask where should I put my money. It is a hedge against uncertainty.”

Well alright. Nevermind then, Bob: I forgive you. But just so we're clear: "a hedge against uncertainty" is not the same thing as an alternative monetary asset, mmk?

Thursday, 7 October 2010

Hayek's Road to Serfrom

One of the hot topics of the week is evaluating the merit of Hayek's Road to Serfdom. I read this book about two years ago now, and I have to say I agree almost entirely with Tyler Cowen's re-assessment of the thing. 

I was surprised by the book: it was not nearly as extreme as I was expecting. In fact, it lays out what to modern eyes are highly reasonable arguments for why the central planning that was dominating the world at the time was doomed to fail. His primary target was the extreme central planning of the fascist and communist states, but his arguments applied equally to the government-planned wartime economies of the Allied powers. 

The book I read immediately afterwards was one by J. M. Keynes. Many of those who currently cite the Road to Serfdom to back up their political views might be surprised to learn that Keynes shared Hayek's fundamental concerns. He agreed with the book's argument about the dangers of central planning; where he differed was in the degree of the response. That Keynes' proposed "middle way" is now considered to be at the Left end of the spectrum speaks volumes about how much society has changed in the past 70 years.

Moreover, that Hayek's predictions failed to materialize is a testament to the degree to which we've internalized many of his arguments in the book. I would argue that the same can be said for Marx. The extremes that both men were railing against no longer exist as credible threats to our society, despite what some will have you believe. In re-reading these texts, their arguments would almost seem quaint were it not for the recognition that the problems were, at the time, very real. 

The flip side to all of this is that this particular book has lost much of its relevancy to the problems we are dealing with today, much in the same way that many of Marx's writings are of little use in addressing contemporary issues. That may not please the self-styled radicals at either end of the ideological spectrum, but for the rest of us it is very good news indeed. 

The world is a strange, strange place

This, from a quick scan of the news: 

- President Evo Morales knees a political opponent in the groin during a soccer match.

- The Philippines bans off-key national anthem singing

- Vietnam introduces state-run Facebook knock-off. "You have a friend request from: The Politburo"

- Rent-a-friend

Thursday, 30 September 2010

Promises, promises...

Paragraphs to ponder, from Karl Smith. Although I've had this point explained to me many times, it never hurts to reflect upon how interconnected and, ultimately, fragile our socio-economic structure really is: 
"All things financial are ultimately promises.
Promises, however, matter. Ultimately they matter because promises are how we coordinate people to make stuff that is bigger and better than any one person could make alone. If we couldn’t make promises to each other we could never build factories, homes, cars, etc. In truth specialization would all but collapse and the modern economy would cease to function.
Many economists like to pretend that the economy functions on the basis of trade. The baker makes bread and trades with brewer who makes beer. But, this isn’t how the real world works is it? The real world is full of promises.
When the baker wants beer he give the brewer a promise. When brewer wants bread he gives the baker a promise. If they don’t trust each other very much they trade in government promises, that’s called legal tender or money. When they trust each other a lot they trade in private promises, that’s called credit.
I have occasionally received gifts in appreciation for my lectures but mostly I receive a big chunk of promises at the end of every month. I use those promises to meet other promises that I have made. And, with the promises I have left over I can get other things that I might want for the month. I keep some of my promises stored away, as a promise to myself.
In the old days when even trust in the government was low promises took the form of metal. For most people the metal had little value but they knew someone else might want it so it was good enough. Today, trust is high. Our legal system is strong and most promises are just bits in a computer system, a little electronic maker that says society promises resources to John Doe. Promises are the foundation of our economy.  That’s why when promises go bad, as they did in the sub-prime crisis, the whole economy goes bad. That’s why some of [us] think the government needs to make some new promises. We are running short."

Wednesday, 29 September 2010

The Autumn of our Discontent

Adam Posen, of the Bank of England's external monetary policy committee, is now convinced that the Bank needs to act fast to avoid a prolonged period of Japanese-style economic stagnation. He argues that the accumulating evidence suggests that the downside risk to doing nothing far outweighs the risks of inflation.


When the overwhelming bulk of pressures in the economy are disinflationary, and when the level of output and employment is clearly likely to be below potential for an extended period, it is right for central bankers to take the additional negative effects of protracted recession on trend productivity growth and on capacity into account.

Is Posen right? I haven't a clue. But he does raise one point which I think is worth noting: there's more at stake here than simply a bit of lost productivity growth and economic capacity:

Let us not forget that it was sustained high unemployment and austerity, the sense that governments were unresponsive to average people’s dire economic conditions, which led to the rise of extremist intolerant parties in pre-war Europe
I've used this historical reference a number of times, but it is an admittedly extreme example. Posen is right to use the language of "let us not forget" as this is merely a reminder - not a prediction of what is to come. Nevertheless, the point is well taken. Last year, Rory wrote a great piece on the brewing summer of discontent: the seething popular anger in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the demand to do something. 

Thankfully, some of the worst predictions have not come to pass. But the danger has not disappeared; a casual scan of the recent news reveals as much. The US has its own backlash in the form of the surging Tea Party movement. The British Labour Party just recently elected Ed Milliband as their leader, indicating a sharp tack to the left. In both cases, these shifts are likely to be politically counter-productive. But in both cases, I read this as a giant "Fuck You" to the ruling consensus that has dominated Anlgo-American policymaking since the late 1990s. 

Granted, prolonged recessions do not necessarily result in deep social unrest. From my (limited) knowlege of Japan, it does not appear that over a decade of economic stagnation has resulted in major upheavals in society. I suspect that this has much to do with the structure and characteristics of Japanese society, however. And it should be pretty clear by now that Europe is definitely not Japan.

To borrow the text from Rory's post last year:

"This poses obvious risks to political stability and commerce. It also constrains the options available to policymakers, making beggar-thy-neighbor actions such as the imposition of trade barriers, subsidization or nationalization of industries and currency devaluation more likely. History tells us that these domestic political considerations, particularly in the developing world, risk reinforcing the downward economic spiral, as policymakers appease factions and fail to reach coordinated regional/global programs. They also risk, particularly in the case of currency devaluations, setting off a [chain] reaction of competitive responses that, in the absence of regional cooperation, ultimately destabilizes the system as a whole."
So it's clear that while inaction is not an option, the kind of response that the political leadership provide matters even more. The G20 proved to be surprisingly successful in coordinating a strong response to the crisis itself, but that level of cooperation is starting to fade in the aftermath as leaders re-focus domestic priorities. The recent signs of a looming "currency war" are a worrisome case in point. 

What we may be facing, then, is a prolonged period of discontent. The only solution is to avoid political posturing and short-termism and take the necessary steps to restore healthy economic growth. These steps may end up being painful or risky but, as Posen rightly points out, the downside risk to doing nothing at all is far too high.    

(photo: Reuters)

Tuesday, 28 September 2010

Readables

Interesting, if superficial, profile of Paul Krugman's recent economic writings. Provides yet more confirmation for why I rarely bother to read them.

Soooo, does this mean Republicans oppose lending to small businesses? Politics: what fun!

Why football (soccer) is a bad business: irrational capital. Proposed solution: ownership by fans.

The voodoo economics of the TV/movie business

Yet more evidence of China moving up the value chain: a collaboration with Japanese companies in computer microchip production.

How to help people in developing countries and make a wicked profit while you're at it.

Thursday, 23 September 2010

Intermission

Posting has been light of the last week or so as I make adjustments for a recent change in my career path. As a result, most of my recent post ideas are currently stuck in draft format - a variety of scattered thoughts lacking coherent direction. (Although really, what else is new?)

Things should return to business-as-usual in the next week or so. In the meantime, feel free to submit any ideas you have for topics you would like to see discussed.

Wednesday, 22 September 2010

Sentence of the Day

From The Economist:

"....Indeed, the problem with the tax debate is not that Democrats and Republicans disagree, but that they mostly agree. Democrats think 98% of Americans should not pay higher taxes; the Republicans say 100% should not."